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Preface 
by 
Günter Verheugen
* 
he European Union’s new Neighbourhood Policy  – the Wider 
Europe initiative – is growing into a major policy priority. There are 
two main reasons for this development. 
•  First, as the ongoing enlargement with ten new member states is 
approaching its successful conclusion, we are committed to 
preventing new dividing lines from being drawn in our continent. 
Enlargement will benefit not only acceding and incumbent member 
states, but also our neighbours. Yet, enlargement may also give rise 
to some challenges that we must jointly address. Our new 
neighbourhood policy aims at maximising benefits and overcoming 
possible problems. 
•  Second, with  enlargement, the area of stability and prosperity in 
Europe expands substantially. Nevertheless, this area can only be 
sustainable if it also extends to our neighbourhood. Achieving such 
an extension is crucial to EU interests. This is the idea behind our 
concept of a ‘ring of friends’, based on shared values and common 
interests. 
Our neighbourhood policy goes beyond the horizon of the ongoing 
enlargement. An enlarged European Union must be capable of speaking with 
one voice and acting coherently and efficiently in the world. A 
comprehensive neighbourhood policy is an important element of this project 
and will be reflected in the  European  Union’s Constitutional Treaty. This 
policy is distinct from the issue of possible further enlargement and concerns 
those of our neighbours for which enlargement is not currently on the 
agenda. It will of course take fully into account differences among them. 
And it will be based on joint ownership of the process. 
The European Neighbourhood initiative is both ambitious and realistic. It 
offers our neighbours advanced forms of cooperation, including a stake in 
the Union’s internal market as a long-term objective and support in 
promoting political and economic reform. It does not close any doors to 
countries with European ambitions; but it also aims at superseding a foreign 
policy concept based on the sole incentive of successive accessions.  
The European Neighbourhood Policy is no longer at its nascent stage. The 
Commission has produced two Communications that have been b roadly 
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endorsed by the Council and the Parliament. Partner countries have 
responded positively. We are at present preparing the first Action Plans to be 
adopted next year, together with country reports and a strategy paper. 
Considerable work is underway for improving cross-border cooperation 
along the enlarged Union’s external borders. These activities do not mean 
that we have solved all problems: a number of issues need to be further 
explored and our new policy will have to meet the test of its implementation. 
The contribution of think-tanks to the elaboration of the European 
Neighbourhood concept has been very substantial. Numerous papers, studies 
and seminars have stimulated the thinking of the Commission, and, I am 
sure, of the other institutions and member states as well. We very much 
welcome these contributions, which will also be needed during the next 
stages of this exercise. 
The present CEPS book by Michael Emerson is a timely, comprehensive, 
thoughtful and forward-looking piece of work, which I very much enjoyed. It 
is based on a thorough knowledge of the issue in all its dimensions  – 
geographic, sectoral and institutional. It has the merit of attempting a 
strategic overview, over an extensive time horizon, without the multitude of 
constraints inherent to similar exercises originating from more official 
sources.  
The book certainly provides food for thought to us in the Commission. On a 
number of issues, we are on the same wavelength, not least on the 
importance we attribute to the European Neighbourhood Policy. There are 
also some points on which I would be more sceptical: for instance, the study 
goes arguably too far in proposing an extension of the Neighbourhood Policy 
to cover countries as distant as Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf region, or 
in suggesting participation of our partners in many EU institutions. Our 
strategy for further enlargement and Europe’s neighbourhood must always be 
compatible and supportive of a European project that aims at a Union that is 
stronger in the pursuit of its essential objectives. In my view, this dimension 
would probably need further highlighting in the study. 
December 2003 
Brussels 
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Chapter 1 
Summary and Conclusions 
ith the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25, the new Wider 
Europe debate – interpreted in the broad sense as in this book – 
rises high up on the EU agenda, complementing the draft 
Constitutional Treaty prepared by the European Convention. Together they 
are defining what the EU is to become. The Convention is defining the EU 
from the inside. The Wider Europe debate is seeking to define it by reference 
to its outer edges and wider neighbourhood. This discourse all connects with 
the widely discussed question about the ‘final frontiers of Europe’, whether 
or not there is to be any final answer. At any event, the generally recognised 
objective is to try to find a formula for the enlargement of the EU that will 
not result in new and dangerous divisions of the continent, or between the 
EU and its wider neighbourhood. 
In March  2003, the European Commission published  its  first policy 
Communication on the subject.
1 This has been followed by two documents 
on European security strategy submitted to the European Council in June and 
December 2003 by High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy Javier Solana,
2 the optique of which is different, but whose content 
overlaps with the Wider Europe. I n response,  the European Parliament 
adopted a report in November  2003, taking a more systematic and 
comprehensive view than the Commission document.
3 These texts may be 
viewed as ‘ White’ or ‘ Green’  Papers of the EU institutions. They are 
important references, yet highly preliminary and incomplete. The present 
document sketches a more structured policy framework and makes proposals 
for how this could be further developed. 
                                                 
1 European Commission (2003a),  Wider Europe  – Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 
COM(2003) 104 final, 11 March. 
2 See J. Solana (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security 
Strategy,  submitted to the European Council,  Brussels,  11–12 December, 
included here as Annex C; see also J. Solana (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, the draft document submitted to the European Council, Thessaloniki, 19–
21 June.  
3 European Parliament (2003), Report on Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 
Rapporteur: Pasqualina Napolitano, final, A5-0378/2003, 5 November. 
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Primary concepts 
It is argued here that there is a need for clearer conceptualisation of this 
debate. Two distinct terms are being used: ‘Wider Europe’ and 
‘Neighbourhood’. The Commission’s paper has confused the two in its title.  
‘Wider Europe’ could be reserved for the well-identified space of Council of 
Europe membership. Without controversy, this is Europe, and all its peoples 
have a degree of identification with its values, history and cultures. Even the 
most disorderly and distant parts of the Wider Europe, for example the South 
Caucasus, have European aspirations. At the level of territorial coverage, 
Wider Europe policy should ideally embrace all the different categories of 
states and entities of Europe not already acceding to the EU or engaged in 
accession negotiations, since otherwise there will be problems owing to the 
lack of coherence. In particular, the Commission’s proposed exclusion of the 
Caucasus from the Wider Europe would need to be corrected,  which the 
Solana papers hint at already. 
Wider Europe is the space in which ‘Europeanisation’ can be said to be the 
general objective, without overtones of cultural imperialism. Europe belongs 
to all these  peoples. ‘Europeanisation’ has become a special form of 
modernisation for the formerly communist and fascist dictatorships, as well 
as the still weak states of Europe. It is a process that all Europeans may 
consider that they own and with which they can identify. The distinction is 
made between accession to EU membership (as a formal legal and political 
act) and Europeanisation as a wider process of political, economic and 
societal transformation. The ideology of Europeanisation appears to be 
democratic, liberal (of  a  social-democratic colour), non-hegemonic, 
multinational, multi-cultural, inclusive and integrative. 
Europeanisation, as the driving force of the Wider Europe idea, may be seen 
as working through three kinds of mechanisms:
4 
•  precise legal obligations coming from preparing for accession to the EU;  
•  objective changes in economic structures and the interests of individuals 
as a result of integration with Europe; and 
•  subjective changes in the beliefs, expectations and identity of the 
individual (regional/ethnic, national, European), feeding into the political 
will to adopt European norms. 
                                                 
4 For a summary of the literature, see G. Noutcheva (2003), “Europeanisation and 
Conflict Resolution”,  CEPS Europa South-East Monitor,  Issue No. 49,  October 
(retrievable at www.ceps.be). For a more detailed presentation of the concepts and 
application to southern Europe, see K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds) (2001), 
Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery, London: Frank Cass.  THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 3 
Europe’s neighbourhood goes wider. To the south and south-east it embraces 
first of all the Mediterranean states of the Maghreb and the Mashrek, which 
are already subjects of the heavily structured Barcelona Process. These states 
are linked to the rest of the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf states, 
and link on to Afghanistan. Europe’s neighbourhood extends to the east to 
Russia’s neighbours of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia, as now 
represented politically by the  membership  map of  the  Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE).  This belt of territory and 
peoples may be called the Greater Middle East. 
From North Africa to Central Asia is the Muslim world (with the singular 
exception of Israel),  which today has become Europe’s main  source of 
security threats, linking the hazards of terrorism, trafficking, illegal 
immigration, weapons of mass destruction, and cultural and ideological 
confrontations. Westerners recommend  variants of their liberal democratic 
model to this vast region. But neither the West – the US and Europe – nor the 
countries of this region themselves have clear ideas of how these non-
democratic regimes may be reformed or perhaps transformed. The sensitivity 
to cultural imperialism is so acute that it connects with the discourse of the 
Islamic fundamentalist hyper-terrorist.  
Although the United States is becoming less of an external actor in the Wider 
Europe as the EU widens and deepens, it remains the leading external actor 
in much of the Greater Middle East. The issue of coherence and coordination 
between EU and US policies is crucial for the Greater Middle East, 
especially in view of the divergences of ideology recently on display 
between Washington’s neo-conservative elements and most Europeans.  
Thus more precise and logical terminology for the Wider Europe debate may 
be to say that the ‘Wider Europe’ is indeed Europe (of the Council of Europe 
map), whereas its wider neighbourhood consists of the ‘Greater Middle 
East’. North America may be viewed as part of Europe’s neighbourhood too, 
but in the present context, this mainly concerns the US as an actor in the 
Greater Middle East.  
Yet these two vast geo-political regions should not be rigidly segmented by 
EU policy.  Some countries of the  southern and  eastern Mediterranean  in 
particular may be willing and able to associate closely with European values 
in due course. Although the Commission’s first document of March was too 
superficial and sweeping in stating that all the Mediterranean countries of the 
Barcelona Process should simply be part of the Wider Europe initiative, it 
should not go to the other extreme either, with a message of ethno-cultural 
discrimination. The Commission now intends to prepare Action Plans under 
the label of the Wider Europe for Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. If other such 
countries of the Mediterranean want to make a serious commitment to 4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
European values, the Council of Europe could open its door to associate 
membership for them, and maybe in due course full membership. Israel and 
the future Palestinian state could be candidates after resolution of the conflict 
(before which Israeli democracy would hardly qualify).   
Five arguments driving a Wider Europe strategy 
First, for the continent of Europe, Europeanisation is an idealistic argument, 
since security threats from within this Wider Europe are now much reduced 
and the ideology of Europe is relatively settled.  Second, f or the Greater 
Middle East, matters of ideology are not settled and for the West the realist 
argument is to limit security threats, which means that the EU and the US 
have to try to work together there. These distinctions,  both territorial and 
ideological, are of course only approximate, and there are fuzzy borders 
between the continents in places (and to some degree ideology has universal 
foundations). Nevertheless the distinction between these first two arguments 
– the idealist and the realist  – is categorical and has crucial policy 
implications.  
Third, there is an efficiency argument that searches for the most effective 
organisation of policy spaces in a complex continental region, and the 
optimal distribution of jurisdictions and powers by level of government in 
multi-tier settings. For some policies or economic networks and 
infrastructures, geography will be a dominant factor, such as river basins or 
seas. But for other policies political commonalities are far more important. 
There is also a search for the most efficient blend of multilateral structures 
and bilateral relations.  
Fourth, there is a  circumstantial argument alongside these three timeless 
views. The current huge expansion of the EU to 25 member states is going to 
take years to digest institutionally. Yet there is already a list of further 
potential candidates. Although the prospect of EU accession is the strongest 
incentive for Europeanisation, the EU’s Wider Europe policy seeks to extend 
this influence as far as possible without making additional commitments for 
new full members, at least for the time being.  
Fifth, there is the comparative advantage argument. The EU’s still fragile 
and incomplete foreign policy system underlines the need for the EU to make 
a credible job of what it can do best in the broad field of external relations. 
This means the Europeanisation of its neighbourhood in the first place, more 
than global power projection. Wider Europe policy may be a key to resuming 
progress towards common foreign, security and defence policies after the 
devastating split caused by the Iraq war.  THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 5 
Images of variable geometry 
Since Wider Europe policy is going  to be highly complex in practice, it 
needs some simplifying images (see chapter 2, Figure 2). 
Dominating powers (or hegemonies), be they global or regional, naturally 
tend towards hub-and-spoke systems. Yet each bilateral relationship between 
hub-and-spoke may be broken down into its various policy dimensions and 
sectors, which is certainly relevant for the specific case of the EU and its 
neighbours.  This  idea  suggests a  matrix. In practice, for the EU and the 
Wider Europe one can identify numerous states o r entities of the Wider 
Europe and the Greater Middle East in the geographical aspect beyond the 
EU of 25 member states. The EU25 of 450 million citizens represents only a 
little over half of the population of the Wider Europe (of the Council of 
Europe map), but about 90% of its national income. The Greater Middle East 
adds almost 400 million more in population, but only another 10% in 
national income (see chapter 2, Table 2). 
Regarding the policy aspect, seven major policy spaces are identified below. 
The huge number of cells in the matrix (see chapter 2, Table 1) is more than 
can receive individualised attention. In order to simplify the system there has 
to be recourse to multilateral relations  between the EU and groups of 
neighbours, for which the image of concentric circles is often referred to. In 
practice, however, the system becomes a blend of bilateral and multilateral 
features, for which the cobweb image serves better.  
Yet even this subtler image encounters a further complication when there is 
more than one hub, with overlapping spokes and cobwebs. The EU, the US 
and Russia are all hubs for parts of the Wider Europe or the Greater Middle 
East. The very idea of overlapping cobwebs becomes so complicated that 
such systems are  unlikely to be sustainable in practice. Either one hub 
dominates or the hubs coordinate. This latter case suggests the Rubik cube 
image, which adds a third dimension to the matrix. Solutions to potential 
discord among the leading actors  are possible but of course difficult to 
organise.  
These images lead on to the substance. The Wider Europe may tend towards 
a cobweb system around the EU. But for the Greater Middle East either the 
US, the EU and Russia will be able to  work out cooperative Rubik cube 
solutions or the international system will be chaotic, or the influence of the 
lesser hubs will turn out to be of only  a  secondary or token nature. The 
matrix turns out to be the main image, since the EU’s task of strategic policy 
definition and planning must be to devise a graduated yet coherent set of 
policies for the many partner states of the Wider Europe. 6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Common European spaces 
Although Wider Europe policy can be approached from either the bilateral or 
thematic sides of the matrix, here the thematic approach is preferred as the 
place  to start. There are already lively but rather chaotic discussions 
underway about common European policy spaces, which take place mainly 
in the bilateral dialogue  between the two European hubs  – the EU and 
Russia. This debate deserves to become more open and inclusive. One may 
start with the three large ‘dimensions’, following the OSCE and the Stability 
Pact for South-East Europe – political, economic and security. But these may 
best be broken down into seven main policy spaces to be more tractable in 
operational terms. Here the several spaces adopted in EU-Russian 
discussions are retained, completed by two additional and highly important 
spaces (democracy and human rights, and macroeconomic and monetary 
affairs). Each space is identified and commented upon very briefly below. 
A. Political and human dimension 
•  A European space of democracy and human rights. Here the Council of 
Europe is well-placed to work alongside the EU as a key partner in the 
Wider Europe. Priority should be given to the least-ordered states of the 
Council of Europe. 
•  A European space of education, culture and research. EU programmes 
are rightly being opened to the Wider Europe. There should be no 
conditionality beyond quality, given that these investments are looking 
decades ahead. 
B. Economic dimension 
•  A European Economic Area (EEA) for trade and market regulations. 
The EU should propose an open-ended multilateral Pan-European Free 
Trade Area (PEFTA) and develop a modular approach for the 
progressive inclusion of the Wider Europe states in t he EU single 
market, with a restructuring of existing EEA and European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) institutions. 
•  A European macroeconomic and monetary area.  The EU’s official 
documents have continued to ignore the inevitable extension of the euro 
into the Wider Europe. Its doctrine is excessively restrictive even in the 
conditions for the newly acceding states, whereas for non-acceding 
states and entities, the policy line needs to be more open and reasoned 
(some micro-states and sub-state entities are already fully euroised). 
•  A European infrastructure and network area. Pan-European networks 
in transport, energy (oil and gas pipelines  and  electricity grids) and THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 7 
telecommunications are being developed with  financial support from 
the EU, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), for which the overriding 
condition should be the economic efficiency of the network as a whole. 
C. Security dimension 
•  A common space of freedom, security and justice. The EU can offer 
powerful incentives to the individual states of the Wider Europe, by 
exchanging increases in the freedom of movement of persons (visas and 
immigration) for improved border controls, and domestic law and order. 
For this  exchange,  the EU needs to  clearly  establish its benchmark 
standards for successive stages, first for visa-free status, and so on to 
Schengen standards.  
•   A space of cooperation in the field of external security. EU instruments 
of security and defence policy are developing and can support the 
Europeanisation process in the still unstable parts of the Wider Europe. 
There should be a comprehensive series of Green or White Papers for the 
Wider Europe, one each for the seven common European policy spaces, with 
further papers on a) institutional issues including association arrangements, 
b) regional organisations and structures and c ) economic aid and its 
conditionality. The Action Plans for individual states of the Wider Europe 
could then be structured along the lines of the common European policy 
spaces, reviewing opportunities and performance under each heading. The 
Action Plans should also review institutional issues in the light of possible 
new categories of association arrangements for states, countries and 
territories.  
The total of ten White or Green Papers may seem a lot, but the figure should 
not be surprising. The subject matter is extremely complex if a 
comprehensive list of common European policy spaces is to be pursued 
seriously. More precisely, one could imagine separate Green Papers being 
prepared by each of the concerned directorates general of the Commission 
according to common guidelines, to be submitted for debate with partner 
states of the Wider Europe as well as EU member states. The Commission 
would then draw up an overarching Wider Europe White Paper.  
Economic aid from the EU is granted on the basis of an exceedingly complex 
set of differentiated rules and regulations for aid to states of different groups. 
These should be made more user-friendly for the context of the Wider 
Europe, notably for projects in overlapping neighbouring states that fall into 
different political categories.  In July 2003, t he Commission published a 
second Communication with proposals moving in this direction, which also 8 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
proposes a New Neighbourhood Instrument post-2006.
5 The conditionality 
question needs systematic consideration. Aid allocations should be  partly 
conditional on policies of the partner government, but there should be 
important exceptions for long-term investments whose time horizons extend 
way beyond political terms of office, as for example in education 
programmes and pan-European network infrastructures. 
The working out of the Green o r White Papers policies, and then their 
application to the bilateral  Action  Plans, corresponds to working out  the 
Wider Europe matrix, which becomes the main image. Coherence across the 
matrix is necessary, but this is not the same as multilateralism. The matrix 
would define the EU’s policy set.  
The Wider Europe and conflict resolution 
The Wider Europe policy framework should reach out to the most disorderly 
zones of the European periphery, especially to South-East Europe, from the 
Balkans to the Caucasus. The EU is uniquely well-placed to introduce a 
quasi-constitutional element, and indeed vision, to aid resolution of the 
ethno-secessionist conflicts that erupted with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and  the  disintegration of Yugoslavia. A systemic view of the 
possibilities is set out in Box 3, chapter 4, which distinguishes three or four 
multi-tier governance systems (sub-state, state, region, EU supranational or 
multilateral, with a wider coalition of external powers and organisations). An 
overarching EU tier of governance  in particular  may be decisive in 
stabilising states and entities of the Wider Europe that are conflict-prone or 
weak, in some cases holding together fragile federative structures. Such 
solutions should be considered a normal part of the constitutional system in 
ethnically complex regions, for both advanced and peaceful societies (e.g. 
Belgium) as well as those that unfortunately succumb to civil war before 
being able to return to peace and reconciliation. Variants on this three- or 
four-tier model have been proposed (and almost accepted in  2003) for 
Cyprus. T he new (still fragile) Union of Serbia and Montenegro may be 
interpreted in this light too. 
Institutions and organisations 
The Wider Europe needs an adequate, multilateral institutional structure, 
whose design is primarily the responsibility of the  European Union. The 
European Conference may  be usefully retained as a standing  forum for 
dialogue on the Wider Europe agenda and more meaningfully renamed the 
                                                 
5 European Commission (2003b), Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood 
Instrument, COM(2003) 393 final, 1 July. THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 9 
Pan-European Conference. But this very thin, ad hoc arrangement should be 
reformed to be more effective. It should be opened to all the member states 
of the Council of Europe and to a degree linked to this organisation, with 
which the EU  is  increasingly developing practical cooperation already. 
Coordination arrangements with the other relevant multilateral organisations 
could also be structured within the framework of the Pan-European 
Conference.  
Regional structures  should  be supported where they have  both  a 
geographical rationale and political value. The Baltic, Barents and 
Mediterranean Seas have seen the development of substantial regional 
structures, as is also the case for South-East Europe. The ‘Northern 
Dimension’, covering north-west Europe, has been promoted by Finland as a 
concept of regional cooperation that embraces the idea of a northern identity 
as well as technical cooperation. The Black Sea region (and the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation  – the BSEC organisation) is the main instance of 
neglect by the EU, a situation that may correct itself given that EU candidate 
states now account for half of its coastline and there are significant policy 
interests in the area (energy supplies, security and conflict resolution).  
The key EU-Russia strategic partnership develops in steps decided at their 
half-yearly summits, promoting ideas for several of the common European 
policy space concepts. But the substance and depth of the relationship are not 
yet impressive and it appears at times more like an irreconcilable partnership. 
The EU hopes to see the Europeanisation of Russia, but looks for this 
without offering either the prospect of EU membership or the incentive of 
joint leadership of the Wider Europe. Russia hopes to re-establish its sway 
over its near abroad and extend its influence in Europe at large, without 
having to fully embrace European political or human rights norms. The EU 
can accept having to deal with Russia in a bilateral mode, without restraining 
its interests in offering incentives for the Europeanisation of any European 
state or in developing its comprehensive set of Wider Europe policies. If 
Russia is not willing or able for some years to join in a genuinely democratic, 
multilateral Common European  House, the EU has to go ahead with its 
matrix.  
For the rest of the Wider Europe the EU should take a fresh look at its 
complicated array of  association arrangements,  which presently  include 
Association Agreements with states, overseas countries (i.e. not states) and 
territories, and with other entities in Europe  that  have close relationships 
with EU  member states. These arrangements, themselves needing clearer 
classification in legal and political terms, should be opened up to serve the 
needs of various sub-state entities, as well as Europe’s advanced micro-states 
and entities. One can conceive of ways of including associated states 
partially into the EU institutional system, to the point where the most 10 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
advanced states may become virtual  member states. Participatory 
arrangements could in principle be devised for all the institutions. The only 
red line that cannot be crossed before acceding to full membership status 
would seem to be  holding  a voting seat at the table of the Council of 
Ministers (one may also add having a member of the European Commission, 
if all member states are to continue to be represented in future). 
The Commission has proposed a new category of ‘Neighbourhood 
Agreements’, to be preceded by Action Plans. The Convention has proposed 
agreements that would ‘develop special relationship(s) with neighbouring 
states’. The Commission makes ‘full implementation’ of existing agreements 
a precondition for any new development, but this is so vague as to be 
virtually meaningless and is certainly devoid of any incentive effect at this 
stage. This ‘full implementation’ condition should also be dropped, since the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for  the  Commonwealth of 
Independent States ( CIS) states (for example) have in any case become 
increasingly obsolete, as the EU’s own policies have developed and the 
states in question become increasingly differentiated.  
The  Action Plans  should not just focus on what the states of the Wider 
Europe should do to conform better to EU norms, as if the process were just 
a weaker version of the regular reports produced for accession candidates, for 
which the reference is complete adoption of the acquis. The EU itself has to 
propose standards and priorities for the common European policy spaces 
adapted to the level of development and economic structures of the diverse 
set of neighbouring states. These then have to be translated into operational 
policy commitments and attached to clear incentives.  
The Greater Middle East 
Even before the Iraq war there was a growing movement of ideas among 
Arab scholars in favour of the region’s progressive democratisation as a key 
to modernisation and development. The UNDP report published in  2002, 
written by Arab scholars, provided a template document, with a focus on the 
three deficits – of freedom, women’s empowerment and human capabilities 
and knowledge.
6 
Faced with the issue of how to respond, various models of Western policy 
may be identified: 
•  Model 1. Acquiescence, with priority given to regime stability, even 
when the regime is authoritarian and repressive. But time has run out for 
Model 1.  
                                                 
6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002),  Arab Human 
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•  Model 2. Passive engagement, with political dialogue over democratic 
values and human rights, but without significant pressures. 
•  Model 3. Active engagement, in a more holistic approach, calling for 
political, economic and human development in parallel.  
•  Model 4. Aggressive engagement,  against objectionable regimes.  This 
model includes sanctions but can bring in a wider arsenal of diplomatic 
measures.  
•  Model 5. Forceful regime change, meaning war in the extreme case or 
political pressures backed by credible threats of force.  
The EU could plausibly recalibrate its Barcelona policy from Model 2 to 
Model 3 and may already be inclined to do so gradually.
7 But it is in the 
nature of the partnership concept that this be done with the aid of incentives 
and not by force. The US, in the shadow of the war with Iraq is developing a 
Middle East Partnership Initiative, which is similar to the Barcelona Process 
in combining technical assistance (for education, business development and 
democratisation) with trade policy initiatives (bilateral free-trade 
agreements). The financing and trade flows on the US side remain small by 
comparison with the EU. US policies here are switching from Model 1 to 
Model 3, as clearly confirmed in a speech by President George W. Bush in 
November 2003; nonetheless the main action has been in the switch for Iraq 
from Model 4 to Model 5, with threats of the same for Iran. The EU has also 
implicitly  shifted its position over Iran closer to the US position, in 
acknowledging the possible legitimacy of  the  use of force to stop the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (moving to somewhere between 
Models 3 and 4). 
The prospects for EU-US coherence at the strategic level are therefore not 
non-existent, yet they depend on two essential conditions: resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the outcome of the Iraq war. For the US, these 
two theatres of operation seem to be linked through the need for the US to 
rescue the calamitous state of its public reputation in the Arab world, where 
its public opinion approval ratings have fallen to virtually zero in some cases. 
For the EU, the belated turn of attention  by the US administration to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the aid of the Quartet’s Roadmap to Middle 
East Peace was welcomed, although the process was itself deeply flawed and 
is now practically defunct. Nevertheless interest in a genuine peace plan has 
been revived with the unofficial Geneva Accord of 1 December 2003. As 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is dismissive towards this plan, it seems 
                                                 
7 This is being advocated by Commissioner Chris Patten in “Democracy Doesn’t 
Flow from the Barrel of a Gun”, Foreign Policy, September-October 2003. 12 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
that implementation has to wait  until  the arrival of a new  government, 
replacing the current Sharon administration.  
There is a risk now that conflict  between the  people and the occupying 
powers in Iraq degenerates to the point where this theatre of operation may 
assume the role played by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories 
as a touchstone for Arab resentment towards the West. It may be that the US 
and its coalition partners will extricate themselves from Iraq once some kind 
of improvement on the Saddam Hussein regime has been established, 
possibly with the UN taking over responsibility for the transition to self-
government. The EU itself can hardly determine the outcome directly. It can, 
however, continue a Middle East policy mainly in the sense identified above 
(Model 3), with a focus on both state-building and region-building. The EU 
has a lready signalled a partial convergence of its security strategy  in  the 
direction of the US over Iran, the Solana documents having acknowledged 
the possible use of force  –  on condition of multilateral legitimacy  –  to 
remove threats of weapons of mass destruction. 
If there were some breakthrough over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
door would be open to renew the drive in favour of regional cooperation. 
Although the Barcelona Process embraces the whole Mediterranean basin, at 
a further stage the EU could foster deeper sub-regional cooperation with the 
Mashreq and Maghreb regions. It could offer the  prospect of institutional 
developments that could be more jointly owned, correcting in some degree 
the highly asymmetric Barcelona Process, which has no organisation of its 
own and relies entirely on the institutions of the EU. The ideas of forming 
Euro-Mashreq and  Euro-Maghreb  communities can be sketched. The 
enlargement of the EU further into the Mediterranean with the accession of 
Cyprus and Malta opens new  opportunities. The EU-Gulf Cooperation 
Council relationship also holds out prospects for further development. As 
and when decisive progress is made in the Middle East peace process, Israel 
should be offered advanced association possibilities ( apparently,  official 
discussions  between Israel and the EU over possible accession to the 
European Economic Area have already begun). 
This recalibration of the Barcelona Process, with the increasingly important 
Maghreb and Mashrek sub-regional components, could become the leading 
element of EU policy towards the Greater Middle East. But with no peace in 
the Middle East, this has to wait; in the meantime, it is quite logical that the 
EU extends its Wider Europe policy into the Mediterranean with bilateral 
Action Plans for those states of the region that it judges to be the most 
promising (Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan). THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 13 
Summary 
This book proposes recalibrating, clarifying and further developing the EU’s 
initial policy ideas on the Wider Europe in the following directions:  
￿  Distinguishing between the Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East. 
￿  Identifying the Wider Europe more closely with the Council of Europe, 
using its membership map as a defining characteristic,  which also 
establishes the basis of common norms of democracy and human rights. 
￿  Adopting a comprehensive view of this continental Wider Europe, 
embracing all states and entities other than those that are already 
negotiating accession  –  which would include the weakest states and 
entities of the region,  and thus  the Caucasus  –  and signalling 
opportunities for Belarus in due course;  initiating a  ‘Pan-European 
Conference’ and reshaping the actual (very thin) ‘European Conference’. 
￿  Providing a systematic framework and incentives for the bilateral Action 
Plans proposed by the Commission, along with 
o  developing the operational content of seven proposed common 
European policy spaces, for each of which the Commission should 
prepare a Green or White Paper; and 
o  taking a fresh look at actual and conceivable categories of  the 
institutional association of states and entities of the Wider Europe 
with the EU, to provide maximum incentives for the 
Europeanisation before or without full accession. 
￿  Recalibrating the model of EU policies for the Barcelona Process and the 
Greater Middle East in a more holistic approach, with greater emphasis 
on democratic values and human rights alongside economic reform and 
human development, and seeking to re-establish an effective partnership 
with the US in this direction. 
￿  Giving increasing focus to sub-regional formats in the Greater Middle 
East (Maghreb, Mashrek and Persian Gulf), with new possibilities for the 
Mashrek that would become plausible with progress on the peace 
process. In  absence of such progress, the focus of the EU’s Wider 
Europe policy turns to bilateral Action Plans for the most promising 
states of the region. | 14 
Chapter 2 
Five Arguments for the Wider Europe 
he debate on the Wider Europe in the EU initially grew out of the 
current enlargement process, which in any case calls for clarification 
of EU policy towards its new neighbours. This discourse led to the 
first Commission paper in March 2003
8 and the literature that now develops.
9  
This debate, however, has connected with two other epochal events. The first 
is the work of the Future of Europe Convention to give stronger shape to the 
EU’s external policies. The second has been the shock of the Iraqi crisis, 
which caused searing divisions within the EU and across the Atlantic, and 
raised at least two fundamental issues: the rules of war and the multilateral 
order, and the strategy of the West in dealing with multiple security threats 
coming from Europe’s wider Islamic neighbourhood.  
These linkages mean that the ‘Wider Europe’ concept extends to defining a 
large part of the EU’s emerging foreign, security and defence policies. 
Although the Iraqi crisis initially left the EU with the impression of being 
hopelessly divided, signs have developed quite rapidly that the shock therapy 
is having a mobilising effect on the EU. The Convention’s proposals for a 
more muscular external policy were supported at the Thessaloniki European 
Council meeting in June  2003, which endorsed an outline of a European 
security strategy proposed by Javier Solana. The strategy was later refined 
and endorsed by the European Council in Brussels in December 2003.
10 
The ongoing search in official EU circles to define the objectives of a Wider 
Europe policy is seen in the different expressions being used at the same 
time, for example ‘ Wider Europe’, ‘proximity’, ‘new neighbours’ and 
‘neighbourhood’. ‘Wider Europe’ would ordinarily be understood to mean 
the rest of geographical Europe, going beyond the EU’s full member states. 
‘Neighbourhood’ can be a  larger concept, ranging beyond  geographical 
Europe to neighbouring non-European areas of particularly close concern. 
                                                 
8 European Commission (2003a), op. cit. 
9 See, for example, H. Haukkala. (2003), A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism 
and the EU’s New Neighbourhood Policy, UPI Working Paper 41, UPI, Helsinki 
(retrievable from http://www.hiskihaukkala.net); this paper contains numerous 
other references. See also  G.  Guicherd (2002),  The Enlarged EU’s Eastern 
Border – Integrating Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova in the European Project, 
SWP Studies, Berlin; and also J. Batt (2003), The EU’s new borderlands, CER 
Working Paper, Centre for European Reform, London, October. 
10 See Solana, op. cit.  
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The Commission’s recent paper encompasses  both with a deliberately 
ambiguous short title ‘Wider Europe  – Neighbourhood’. The Solana 
documents talk of extending the “zone of security around Europe” with a 
“ring of friends”. 
For this book the term ‘Wider Europe’ is at times used simply as shorthand 
to cover the whole subject.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of operational 
policies the different political and  geographical maps have to be defined 
more precisely. Below a distinction is proposed between ‘Wider Europe’ and 
the ‘Greater Middle East’, (which is also illustrated in Figure 1). 
(a)  ‘Wider Europe’ covers the whole of the geographical and political map 
of Europe, as represented by the membership map of the Council of 
Europe.
11 For this ‘Wider Europe’, the EU is the leading actor, while 
Russia is still a second European hub. The US is becoming less of an 
actor in intra-European affairs (notwithstanding US Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s promotion of ‘new’ versus ‘old’ Europe). 
(b)  ‘Greater Middle East’ starts with the non-European shores of the 
Mediterranean and extends to the rest of the Middle East and Persian 
Gulf states, then further on to Afghanistan and Central Asia. This area is 
Europe’s surrounding neighbourhood, entirely of Islamic culture, except 
for Israel. The ‘Greater Middle East’ name is our preferred choice since 
the  surrounding  ‘neighbourhood’ is too anodyne a term,  and with 
Europe’s own substantial Islamic communities, it is not appropriate to 
stress the cultural dichotomy. For the Greater Middle East, the leading 
external actor is often the United States, and in parts, Russia remains an 
important hub. The EU is present everywhere, most forcefully in the 
Mediterranean, but it is not a dominant external actor anywhere in this 
wide region.   
The case for the EU to develop an overall Wider Europe strategy may be 
based on five arguments. The first two are philosophical paradigms that lie at 
the heart of international relations theory.  
First, the idealist argument combines a conception of political and economic 
norms and values with a sense of European identity, based on history, culture 
and geography. At the official level this idealist argument has been reflected 
in the European Union’s commitment to be open to all European 
democracies. The EU is flanked by the Council of Europe as a European 
organisation committed explicitly to democracy and human rights, which is 
able to accept all European democracies, including some that either do not 
want to accede to the EU or do not yet completely fulfil the Copenhagen 
criteria.  
                                                 
11 With the temporary exception of Belarus. 16 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
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The Council of Europe map is therefore a well-founded  geographical-
political reference for a Wider Europe policy driven by the idealist argument. 
The distinction is to be made between accession to EU membership (a formal 
political and legal act) and ‘Europeanisation’, which is a wider process of 
political, economic and societal transformation. Europeanisation may be seen 
as working through three kinds of mechanisms:
12 
•  precise legal obligations coming from preparing for accession to the EU 
and acceding to the Council of Europe (which is implicitly the EU’s 
associated democracy and human rights agency);  
•  objective changes in economic structures and the interests of individuals 
as a result of integration with Europe, including economic incentives 
offered by the EU, changes in the domestic rules of the game in politics 
and business, and the strategic position of domestic actors; and 
•  subjective changes in the beliefs, expectations and identity of the 
individual (regional/ethnic, national, European), feeding into the will of 
the individual, political parties and interest groups to accept or even push 
for the adoption of European norms of business, politics and civil 
society.  
The key mechanism of Wider Europe strategy is ‘Europeanisation’ as 
defined here. For more vivid views of Europeanisation, going beyond the 
desiccated language of political science, one may take the words of Jadranko 
Prlic, former Foreign Affairs Minister for Bosnia and Herzegovina:
13 
The EU leverage is identification of the EU in the (Balkan) region as 
an area with security, jobs, a decent and rising standard of living, the 
rule of law upheld by accountable, democratic, clean public 
institutions, and a system of minorities protected by law, not by the 
carving out of territories…Without recognition that the future of the 
region is in the EU, there is no chance for the implementation of a 
coherent plan. Not only the political elite, military officers [and] 
intelligentsia, but also the majority of the public should share this 
opinion. For the first time all the countries from the region, even the 
participants in the recently ended conflict, are attempting to join the 
European main stream. 
                                                 
12 For a presentation of the concepts and application to southern Europe, see 
Noutcheva, op. cit., and Featherstone and Kazamias, op. cit.  
13  See J. Prlic (2002), “Milestones towards a Reunited Europe: Agenda for 
Integration of South-Eastern Europe into the European Union”, Zeitschritft fur 
gegeneartsforschung, 51, Jahrgang, Heft 10-12/2002, pp. 543–593; for the view 
of a Serbian student, see Annex F.  18 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Second, the realist argument is about the EU’s security interests. The Greater 
Middle East is the locus or  source of Europe’s greatest concentration of 
security threats. The Solana documents note the poll data showing the threats 
that EU citizens fear most: 1) international terrorism, 2) organised crime, and 
3)  weapons of mass destruction.
14 All of these threats are present in the 
Greater Middle East. The EU has so far been a ‘soft-power’ actor on the 
world stage, looking after its security interests by developing deep bonds of 
economic interdependence with its neighbours. It is beginning, however, to 
develop a harder discourse and the instruments to go with it. On 16 June 
2003, EU Foreign Ministers adopted a statement recognising that weapons of 
mass destruction, maintained in defiance of international obligations, may in 
the last resort have to be removed by force. The Solana documents suggest 
that the EU should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions than the 
Petersberg tasks, to include joint disarmament operations amongst others. 
Notwithstanding these developments in the wake of the Iraqi crisis, the EU’s 
instruments remain primarily in the soft-power department. Its first priority 
in the Greater Middle East is the Mediterranean basin, which the Barcelona 
Process seeks to transform gradually through economic development and 
regional cooperation into political regimes that come closer to European 
values. The Mediterranean could become a leading region for progress across 
the whole of the Greater Middle East, stretching all the way through to the 
Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Central Asia.  
These two paradigms have of course a long and eminent lineage, from the 
idealist world of Kant’s eternal peace through to the brutally realist world of 
Hobbes and Machiavelli. Attempts have been made to radicalise this battle of 
the theoretical paradigms in analysis of the current transatlantic differences, 
notably by Robert Kagan, who argues that the US and Europe now inhabit 
different planets, Europeans coming from Venus and Americans from 
Mars.
15  Nevertheless t he argument  is considered more provocative than 
plausible by many Europeans, including Javier Solana.
16  
Third,  the efficiency argument comes from economics and the political 
science of multi-tier governance. It concerns the search for the most efficient 
organisation of policy spaces or the distribution of jurisdictions and powers 
of public policy by the level of government in multi-tier settings. For some 
policies, or economic networks and infrastructures, geography will be a 
dominant factor, such as river basins or seas, even where these are or have 
                                                 
14 See Solana, op. cit. 
15 R. Kagan (2002), “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review, June and July.  
16 Javier Solana, in a lecture at Harvard University, 7 April 2003, pointed out that 
“It was only in the arms of Venus that Mars found peace. And was not their 
beautiful daughter the goddess Harmonia?” THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 19 
been divided politically. There is also a sorting-out of policies between those 
for  which  geographical contiguity is of primary importance and those for 
which political commonalities are far more important,  as well as those 
policies for which multilateralism has serious advantages over bilateralism.  
Fourth, a  circumstantial argument may be added to these three timeless 
discourses. The current huge expansion of the EU to 25 member states is 
going to take years to digest institutionally. Yet there is already a list of 
further potential candidates. Although the prospect of EU accession is the 
strongest incentive for Europeanisation, the EU’s Wider Europe policy seeks 
to extend this influence as far as possible without full membership for the 
time being.  
Fifth, the EU’s deep divisions over the Iraq war also underlines the argument 
that in the field of external relations, the EU should at least make a credible 
job of what it can do best. This means Europeanisation of its neighbourhood, 
more than global power projection,  which is a  comparative advantage 
argument. Wider Europe policy may be a key to resuming progress towards 
common foreign, security and defence policies after the devastating splits 
caused by the Iraq war. 
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Chapter 3 
The Wider Europe Matrix 
3.1  Variable geometry 
An ordered discussion of Wider Europe, from the EU policy-maker’s 
standpoint, may be framed in a matrix in two dimensions, by geographical 
coverage and policy domain. Such an approach is in any case useful as a 
consistency check, since wherever an EU policy or institution is opened for 
one state or group of states, it has to be asked what this means for others, and 
for the coherence and efficiency of the whole system.  
The simplified matrix shown in Table 1 o nly has 12 zones in the 
geographical vector and seven policy spaces in the policy vector, translating 
into 84 cells to be described. This template gives a hint of the complexity of 
the subject. Yet it is still unduly simplified for many practical purposes, since 
the EU largely follows a bilateral approach differentiated by individual 
partner states, even if they are brought together in groups for some purposes. 
The individual states and entities of the Wider Europe and Greater Middle 
East are listed in Annex A and total no less than 52, excluding the EU of 25 
member states.  
The policy dimensions embrace the whole of the EU system of pillars and 
institutions, since Wider Europe policy may in some cases go as far as virtual 
membership of the EU, through association with many of its policies and at 
least some of its institutions. Indeed, a question addressed below is how far 
the EU could or should go towards  full membership in its policies of 
association of its neighbours. 
Although many cells of the matrix are of little substance, many of them do 
receive individualised attention in the bilateral partnership or association 
councils  between the EU and its partners, a s well as their subordinate 
working groups for specific topics. No wonder that the EU institutions feel 
overstretched at times. There  is a  real need to make the whole system 
coherent, to search for ways to simplify and rationalise it, and thus to exploit 
its potential synergies.  
The EU’s relationship with the Wider Europe is in any case heading in the 
direction of this highly complex matrix. With the progressive development of 
its competences under the new pillars, EU policy-makers are deliberately 
assembling a complete toolkit of instruments for external action,  which 
means that the ‘matrix as  a  consistency check’ becomes increasingly 
relevant.  
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Table 1. Simplified matrix of the Wider Europe and its neighbourhood* 
  Political & human dimension  Economic dimension  Security dimension 
  Democracy & 
human rights 
Education, culture 
& research 
European 
Economic Area 
European 
monetary area 
European infrastruc-
ture & network area 
Freedom, security 
& justice 
Cooperation in 
external security 
Wider Europe               
1. EEA/EFTA & micro-states               
2. Accession candidates               
3. Balkans (SAA states)                
4. European PCA/CIS states                
  4a. Russia               
  4b. Bel/Ukr/Mold               
  4b. Caucasus               
Greater Middle East               
5. Mediterranean               
  5a. Maghreb               
  5b. Mashrek               
6. Gulf (GCC), Iraq & Iran               
7. Central Asia & Afghanistan               
Pan-European areas               
8. Council of Europe map               
9. OSCE, EBRD, NATO-PfP               
Overlapping regions               
10. Baltic Sea               
11. Black Sea               
12. Mediterranean Sea               
*Note: The cells of the matrix are shown empty here, since each one would require a substantial document. Yet the idea may be to develop for each policy space a graduated and coherent  
set of models for associate relationships with the EU. 22| MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Unfortunately for the work of the policy planner, the matrix model is still an 
oversimplification. Figure 2 underlines this point. There are several systemic 
models that are alive, overlapping and constantly evolving. The images of 
the hub-and-spoke, cobweb, concentric circles, matrix and Rubik cube each 
represent an essential idea. 
The hub-and-spoke model is where a leading power works out its relations 
with its neighbours bilaterally.  This is the model typically favoured by a 
hegemonic power. 
The  cobweb model is where the  leading power assembles groups of 
neighbours by their shorter or longer  geographical/political distance in 
concentric circles from the centre, but sharing elements of multilateralism 
with each of these groups. In Europe one may identify the successive 
concentric circles of the euro core-group, then the EU itself and so on with 
the EEA, the Council of Europe and OSCE.  This  model  may be more 
democratic and less hegemonic than the hub-and-spoke model, by virtue of 
its elements of multilateralism. It is also of interest as a buffer-zone security 
model, e.g. for interior ministers trying to control illegal immigration. 
In reality the cobweb model tends to be segmented with regional groups such 
as the Mediterranean in the Barcelona Process and in the Balkans with the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements. We may call this the segmented 
cobweb model.  
Still the image is inadequate, since there are other leading actors beyond the 
EU to be brought into the picture, especially for the Greater Middle East and 
the former Soviet Union. In all these regions, the US undertakes the most 
powerful hub-and-spoke system of bilateral relations, with a lesser emphasis 
on the multilateral features of the cobweb model. Russia seeks to maintain its 
own cobweb model for the CIS states and sub-groups. Thus the analyst of 
real world diplomacy has to handle the workings of a system that consists of 
two or more overlapping hubs-and-spokes  or segmented cobweb models. 
Just attempting to visualise the images of Figure 2 being extended to handle 
three overlapping sets is enough to demonstrate that the system is becoming 
unmanageably complex. It could not work. Therefore it has to slim down to 
something simpler.  
One possibility is that one hub comes to dominate, while the others may 
continue to exist in form but with little or no real effect. A second possibility 
is where several hubs coordinate, either through bilateral or trilateral 
alliances of the leading powers (combinations of the EU, Russia or the US).  
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Figure 2. Model types for the organisation of a complex region 
 
 
 
§  The  hub-and-spoke system is based on bilateral relations  between a 
leading power and many smaller states or entities. 
§  The cobweb system is where there are successive concentric circles of 
states and entities surrounding (neighbouring or dependent upon) the 
leading power, but where there are multilateral relations around each 
circle as well as bilateral relations with the leading power. 
§  The  matrix represents the disaggregation of the relations  between a 
leading power and a complex region by policy domain and by state or 
entity.  
§  The Rubik cube represents the same matrix where there is more than 
one leading power.  24 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Hubs could also coordinate by making more use of regional or global 
multilateral organisations or by using Quartet formulae for combining the 
leading powers with the multilateral organisations (e.g. the EU, Russia, the 
US and the UN in the case of the Middle East Roadmap). This  idea  is 
suggested in the cube image in Figure 2, where the three major external 
actors could be more or less in line with each other,
17 but they could also be 
seriously discordant. Thus the Rubik cube may find a solution or it can be a 
chaotic jumble of positions where the solution remains elusive.  
We revert now to the simpler matrix approach as a check on what the EU is 
or may b e doing, taking the  geographical and policy dimensions 
successively. We return later to the complications of the multiple hubs (in 
section 4.2 on the Greater Middle East).  
3.2  The geographical vector 
The Commission’s Communication on the Wider Europe of M arch  2003 
addresses the future of relations for ‘neighbouring countries that do not 
currently have the prospect of membership of the EU’. This leads to various 
minimalist and maximalist conceptions. The Commission’s paper is itself at 
the minimalist end of the spectrum. The Wider Europe of Ukraine, Moldova 
and Belarus (with ambiguous references to Russia as a special case)  is 
focused upon, along with  the non-European Mediterranean states of the 
Barcelona Process. The European Parliament’s report advocates a  more 
comprehensive approach to  “encompass a vast pan-European and 
Mediterranean region, structured bilaterally, sub-regionally and regionally 
(including the Northern Dimension and cooperation in the Black Sea and 
Mediterranean regions)”.
18 The present paper adopts a similarly 
comprehensive approach.  
The summary statistics in Table 2 show the Wider Europe to consist of 52 
states or entities (including the EU) with a population of 810 million. The 
EU25 represents 55% of this total population, but 90% of its economic size. 
The Greater Middle East brings in 25 further states with a population of 392 
million. But their economies are only about 10% of that of the enlarged EU. 
The regional groupings in Table 2  are ranked  roughly in terms of 
geographical, political and cultural proximity.  
 
                                                 
17 For a detailed application of this model, see M. Emerson and N. Tocci (2003), 
The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East, CEPS, Brussels. 
18 See European Parliament, op. cit. THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 25 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East, 
2001 
  Number 
of states 
Pop. 
(millions) 
National 
income 
($ billions) 
Wider Europe       
EU  25  450  8,500 
EEA/EFTA & micro-states   8  12  433 
EU candidates  3  96  219 
Other South-East Europe, SAA states  5  24  43 
European states of CIS  7  225  313 
Non-recognised secessionist entities  4  3  NA 
Total, Wider Europe  52  810  9,508 
       
Greater Middle East       
Mediterranean  10  174  255 
Gulf (GCC), Iraq & Iran  9  135  590 
Central Asia, Afghanistan  6  83  41 
Total, Greater Middle East  25  392  886 
       
Total, Wider Europe and  
Greater Middle East  78  1,202  10,394 
Note: NA refers to ‘not available’. 
Source: World Bank database. 
3.2.1  The Wider Europe 
The non-EU states of the  European Economic Area are a first category, 
covering Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Of course these states are fully 
part of Western Europe. Nevertheless their model is of interest as an exercise 
to see how close integration with the EU can be possible without full 
institutional membership.
19  
All EEA states are legally integrated into the EU single market, albeit with 
some exceptions.  This  integration  has led to some joint institutional 
developments for implementation, notably the (confusingly named) EFTA 
Surveillance Authority and EFTA Court,  which are interesting models of 
partial institutional integration with the EU. Norway and Iceland are also full 
members of the Schengen area and have some interesting institutional 
arrangements in this context (which are discussed further in chapter 4). As 
NATO members, these two states are also in the first ring of associates of the 
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European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Switzerland refused the EEA 
model in a referendum and reverted to an ad hoc set of bilateral, sector-
specific agreements.  This  case  is also an interesting model for bilateral 
neighbourhood agreements. 
Next there are the remaining accession candidates. These come in several 
grades: Bulgaria and Romania are among those in negotiation; Turkey has a 
2004 date for a decision whether to begin negotiations; Croatia has had its 
application acknowledged; and Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia are 
stating their intentions to apply soon.  
Although Turkey is not yet in the accession negotiation process, it is already 
in the customs union with the EU, meaning that it has aligned its external 
tariffs with those of the EU, in addition to engaging in free trade with it. 
Turkey is also a key country associating with the ESDP,  following an 
episode in 2002–03 in which Turkey was blocking an agreement to make 
certain NATO assets available to the ESDP. Turkey is also a key country for 
the Justice and Home  Affairs (JHA) pillar of the EU, given the country’s 
interface with the Middle East and the Caucasus. Since EU accession will at 
best take a number of years, during which the Europeanisation process in 
Turkey has to be sustained,  it remains an important piece of the Wider 
Europe puzzle.  
At the Thessaloniki summit of 21 June 2003, the EU confirmed that all the 
countries  of  South-East Europe  are now considered  actual or potential 
candidates for membership. There was agreement to introduce the prospect 
of ‘European  Partnership’ agreements, inspired by the existing model of 
accession partnerships, as a way to enhance the present Stabilisation and 
Association Process.
20 The general idea is mainstream Europeanisation, 
seeking to enhance incentives for reform processes. Lines of policy 
development would include: discussion of visa and immigration policies; 
extension of EU education programmes to the region; extension of the pan-
European, diagonal, cumulation rules  of  origin for trade preferences;  an 
increase in the aid budget; an enhancement of Balkan regional cooperation; 
and association with EU foreign policy positions. 
Yet some of the Balkan states or entities are so far away from European civil 
norms that they are protectorates of the international community and the EU. 
Here the  paradigm changes. The Wider Europe model acquires harder 
properties at its outer edges than in its core and introduces a key issue for 
Wider Europe policy. The cobweb model supposes that the reach of EU 
policies gradually fades away as the  geographical and normative distance 
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from core Europe increases. But the Wider Europe model has to be more 
complex. On the one hand the degree of ‘normal’ integration into the EU 
weakens as the geographical and normative distance increases. On the other 
hand, there emerges a zone at the outer edges of Europe where the disorders 
of the weak states call for stronger support, with protectorate regimes in the 
extreme cases.  
Russia, which has a serious hegemonic tradition behind it, has introduced the 
complication of having its own hub-and-spoke system with some CIS states. 
Moreover Russia is the neighbour that does not want to accede to the EU, 
because it is too big and special to fit in with the constraints of membership. 
There is some overlap of the spokes of the two hub-and-spoke systems – the 
EU and Russia – in the former Soviet states lying between the enlarged EU 
and Russia. This overlap is set to become an important aspect of bilateral 
EU-Russian relations.  
These two giants of the European area, the EU and Russia, seek to develop a 
strategic bilateral partnership. At times both parties seem to think in terms of 
joint management of a Wider European duopoly, disregarding the spokes. 
The communication from their latest summit in November 2003 announced 
an agreement to develop four common policy spaces (a common economic 
space; a common space of freedom, security and j ustice; a space of 
cooperation in the field of external security; and a space of research and 
education, including cultural aspects – see Annex E). The common economic 
space is also officially named the Common European Economic Space 
(CEES), which heightens the ambiguity over whether the EU and Russia are 
thinking about their bilateral relations or  together  designing the pan-
European order. In fact, the Concept Paper adopted by the last summit (also 
reproduced in Annex E) makes it clear that the two parties are discussing 
their bilateral economic relations and not a pan-European economic space.  
A recent speech by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister V.A. Chizhov confirms 
the Russian view that the system should consist of two hub-and-spoke 
systems, in which the EU should agree not to interfere with the development 
of CIS integration.
21 Mr Chizhov goes on to explain a set of reasons why the 
Wider Europe concept  “has an inherent conceptual deficiency”.  First, it 
covers countries that have  “totally different and sometimes incompatible 
goals”. Second, the wide geographical scope makes the project vulnerable to 
be taken “hostage to regional risks”. Third, it raises questions about existing 
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regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Northern Dimension and the 
BSEC. Fourth, it raises concerns for Russia’s strategic partnership with the 
EU. Although one could debate some of these  arguments, the main point 
seems to be that Russia does not like this Wider Europe idea, preferring its 
bilateral relationship with the EU and a free hand to deepen CIS integration. 
This  stance  amounts to saying that Russia does not want to see a 
strengthening of a multilateral Wider Europe or a Common European House, 
either under EU leadership or through the Council of Europe or OSCE. In 
these organisations, Russia is constantly being embarrassed by many small 
states that are brandishing norms of democracy and human rights. For the 
moment,  Russia still seems to prefer the different game of geo-political 
competition, perhaps misjudging the strength of the cards in its hand. 
Indeed, Russia has noticed that Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are priority 
interests for the acceding EU states and are prime targets for the new Wider 
Europe policy of the EU. The complication of the overlapping spokes and 
hubs awaits resolution, with Ukraine and Moldova aspiring to a European 
future, while Belarus seeks to deepen re-integration with Russia.  
The three countries of the South Caucasus are excluded from the Wider 
Europe with a footnote in the Commission Communication of March 2003: 
“Given their location, the Southern Caucasus therefore also fall[s] outside the 
geographical scope of this initiative for the time being”. Presumably “for the 
time being” refers to the fact that these states are not direct neighbours of the 
EU25  (although they all border Turkey).  This exclusion reflects  the low 
political prioritisation of the Caucasus and the discouraging experiences the 
EU has had with its  programmes there.  The exclusion was immediately 
controversial and the Solana documents  seem to want to correct it:  “We 
should take a stronger interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, 
which will in due course also be a neighbouring region”.
22 The European 
Parliament’s report explicitly advocates inclusion of the South Caucasus.
23 
This ends the list of European countries, all of which are members of the 
Council of Europe (except the pariah Belarus). A cogent position for the EU 
would be to say that the Council of Europe map is the Wider Europe. These 
are all states that have opted for European values and are undisputedly part 
of Europe. Nevertheless, the European Conference (the periodic meetings 
convened by the EU to discuss Wider Europe questions) confuses the picture 
by including  the entire continent except the South Caucasus and Belarus. 
This so far unimpressive Conference should be reformed, a subject to which 
we return later. 
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3.2.2  The Greater Middle East 
The EU’s  first priority external to Europe is the  South and  East 
Mediterranean, for  which there is the highly institutionalised  Barcelona 
Process. Against the background of the Commission's Communication on 
Wider Europe, Commissioner Chris Patten has said,  “The EU's most 
successful external policy has been its enlargement. We must now see how 
we can establish with our Mediterranean  partners ways of developing the 
Barcelona Process to bring them as many as possible of the same benefits, 
even if the question of joining the EU is not on the table for them.”
24 But this 
friendly remark begs the question  of  whether the Arab states of the 
Mediterranean will be prepared within the next  10 or even  20 years to 
subscribe seriously to European political and human rights standards. As yet 
there is hardly any Arab state in which it is possible to have a frank and 
direct dialogue with the authoritarian  leaderships about achieving high 
democratic and human rights standards, in the sense that Council of Europe 
members commit to.  
Israel, however, presents a special case, with arguments in favour of 
considering it  a European state. Israel’s population largely comes from 
Europe, and many of its citizens have the option to acquire the citizenship of 
their former home state, and many are now doing so. Israel is the only 
southern Mediterranean state whose citizens enjoy visa-free access to the 
EU. Its economy could easily fit into the EEA. Some European and Knesset 
parliamentarians have adopted a manifesto in favour of ultimate EU 
accession. Although few consider this a plausible scenario, there are schemes 
for  a  very advanced association that are thinkable, n otably in the Wider 
Europe context.
25 The Commission and Israel intend to examine the 
possibility of Israel’s accession to the EEA.
26 
For its Wider Europe policy, the Commission is proposing to  start with 
Action Plans for Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. A judgement is being made 
that these three states are the most promising Arab states for deeper 
association with the EU. Their political regimes are hardly less democratic 
than that of the Council of Europe member- state Azerbaijan. The essential 
political point  is also being made by the EU that the Wider Europe and 
neighbourhood strategy should not have the form or effect of deepening the 
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divide between Europe and the Arab states of the Mediterranean, wherever 
the latter show serious signs of wishing to converge on European norms. 
Nevertheless, the Iraq war now puts the whole of the Middle East in a new 
perspective. The EU has already been advancing a free-trade agreement with 
the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and has begun to negotiate a 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran. Post-Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s 
place in the region remains to be clarified. But if it becomes a democratic 
state it will be  a key element in some kind of new Middle East order, 
especially if there is also progress over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In any 
case, given the importance of Persian Gulf energy supplies to Europe (and 
the continuing cascade of consequences of US policy that are likely after the 
Iraq war), along with Turkey’s direct borders with Iraq and Iran, the EU’s 
policies towards the Greater Middle East area are sure to become stretched as 
a continuum across the whole of the Middle East, from Morocco to the 
Persian Gulf. 
Similarly Central Asia has to be kept in mind as part of the Greater Middle 
East. Political commitments have already been made through the decision to 
include all the former Soviet Union states into the OSCE, the EBRD and 
NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). The region’s significance for the security 
of Europe has increased since 11 September 2001. Afghanistan emerged as 
the epicentre of the new hyper-terrorism and is now the location of a major 
European contribution to peacekeeping and state-building. Central Asia links 
to Afghanistan as a transit route for drugs. The ancient Silk Road to Europe, 
re-invented by the EU under an ambitious, integrated transport project
27 for 
aid to Central Asia and the Caucasus,  has become notorious for carrying 
more drugs than silk. 
3.3  The policy vector 
In this section the matrix is discussed in more detail. The three large policy 
‘dimensions’ have to be broken down into smaller policy domains for 
operational purposes. The main headings that follow are in line with the 
three-pillar system of the EU and the common spaces identified in the EU-
Russia summits (see Box 1). Nevertheless, these official categories are not 
sufficiently systematic or comprehensive for an overall Wider Europe policy. 
The question is how the EU does or could deploy the whole range of its 
policy instruments in the Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East. This 
question also involves the choice of how to use the regional and multilateral 
organisations. An objective criterion for these choices is the subsidiarity 
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principle applied to multi-tier governance structures, i.e. the search for the 
most efficient space for organising given policy functions. 
 
Box 1. Three common European policy ‘dimensions’ and seven ‘spaces’ 
 
A. Political and human dimension 
1. Democracy and human rights 
2. Education, culture and research 
 
B. Economic dimension  
3. Economic area (for external trade and internal market regulations) 
4. Monetary and macroeconomic area (euro and macroeconomic policy) 
5. Economic infrastructure and network area (transport, telecommunications, 
  energy and environment) 
 
C. Security dimension  
6. Justice and home affairs  
7. External and security policies 
 
3.3.1  Political and human dimensions 
Human rights and democracy  
By a seemingly lucky piece of institutional history, the domains of human 
rights and democracy are already well-structured for a Wider Europe policy. 
The Council of Europe has established the political norms and created the 
most operational jurisprudence of human rights that exists in the world at the 
international level. The Parliamentary Assembly, the Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Court of Human Rights are its 
mechanisms.  For those states that are not ready for EU membership, the 
Council of Europe provides full inclusion and identification with Europe, 
which is ideal for a Wider Europe policy. The Council of Europe map is 
clear and simply covers all of Europe, excluding only the notorious 
Lukashenko regime in Belarus.  
The EU’s constitutional Convention has proposed raising the legal status of 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights by formally making 
the  EU  a  party to it.  This  link would  naturally strengthen the possible 
synergies  between the two institutions for the purposes of Wider Europe 
policy.  Although the Commission’s Communication hardly mentions the 
Council of Europe, the EU could use it as a framework for increasing the 
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rights. The EU could declare that membership of the Council of Europe was 
the primary condition for eligibility for inclusion in Wider Europe policies 
(with a message for Belarus).  
Similar principles of democracy and human rights are inscribed into the texts 
and agenda of the OSCE, with its human dimension. The membership of 
OSCE, beyond the Council of Europe, extends to Central Asia (apart from 
the US and Canada). Yet the leaderships of these countries are now among 
the least committed either to democracy or to the respect for human rights, 
with the cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan having reached extreme 
notoriety. The OSCE has represented a considerable institutional investment 
towards helping to maintain order in the post-Soviet area, and its role can 
now be adapted to the new agenda of security threats.  Although this 
institution is sometimes regarded as half-dead, it should not be dissolved.  
Both the Council of Europe and OSCE are active in the field of national 
minorities. The Council of Europe has adopted normative texts, to which 
many but not all EU member states have acceded, and whose application it 
monitors. OSCE’s former High Commissioner for National Minorities Max 
van der Stoel built up a highly appreciated mediating role during his period 
in office. He worked actively in implicit coordination with the EU over the 
accession candidate states, where the  OSCE’s (Mr van der Stoel’s) 
recommendations  effectively became part of the conditionality of the 
accession negotiations, e.g. for the Baltic states in relation to their Russian 
minorities. With the accession process completed, it  remains to be seen 
whether or how the EU may sustain its interest in minority questions, given 
the extreme reluctance of some of the EU15 member states to see the EU 
adopt legislation in the field of national minorities. Yet in this context, the 
EU should have all the more interest in helping to build on the work of the 
Council of Europe and OSCE in this field.
28 
The EU would like to see its political values spread to the Greater Middle 
East. But the gap between the Wider Europe, which knows what its values 
are, and the Greater Middle East, which is in a state of ideological turmoil, is 
categorical. So are the Western strategies. Should the democratisation of the 
Greater Middle East be pursued with gentle technical-assistance grants to 
non-governmental organisation (NGOs)? Or at the other extreme, should it 
be a target of Washington’s neo-conservative prescription for forceful regime 
change? We return to this fundamental issue in the sections that follow. 
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Education, culture and research 
The principal policy issue  in this domain  is how far the education 
programmes of the EU, including university scholarships, doctoral and post-
doctoral research grants, should be extended to students and researchers of 
the Wider Europe and other neighbours. If the objective is that a very weak 
state of the Wider Europe should become a member state of the EU when it 
reaches European standards, which in some cases may be in 20 years time, 
then now is the time to form the next generation to lead the process. The EU 
Erasmus  programme began in the  1970s and became a very important 
instrument for fostering the mobility of students within the EU. The Wider 
Europe idea implies a case for an analogous programme for the whole of 
Europe. The Tempus programme has made a start in this direction, but it now 
needs and deserves fuller development. 
Ministers of education from 40 European counties have set the objective of 
achieving a coherent and cohesive European Higher Education Area by 2010 
(the  so-called ‘Bologna Process’, associated with the Council of Europe). 
This project aims at the harmonisation of  education norms, the raising of 
minimum standards and fostering mutual recognition. The group started to 
work in Bologna in  1999. At their latest meeting in  Berlin in September 
2003, they agreed a deadline  of 2005 for making their university degrees 
comparable and for improving mutual recognition.  
EU policies are already active in this area, as well as in the research and 
development  domain, with the 6
th R esearch Framework  Programme. The 
creation of a European research space is also a plausible concept and one that 
is forward-looking. It is a policy that should not be conditional on short-term 
political criteria. There are  already  some investments in multilateral 
structures, such as INTAS, the independent association that fosters scientific 
and research collaboration between the EU and CIS states (the resources for 
it come from the EU, but the policy-making and execution is multilateral). 
3.3.2  Economic dimension 
European Economic Area  
There is a well-established hierarchy of trade and market regimes relevant 
for the Wider Europe: 
§  membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO); 
§  free trade, with zero tariffs and the  enhancements of pan-European 
rules of origin; 
§  customs union, meaning common external tariffs in addition to free 
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§  single market, where internal market regulations are harmonised and 
there is an assurance of total free access for goods and services. 
There is, however, a huge confusion at present of concepts, terminology and 
policies. The existing European Economic Area sounds like something big, 
but only adds Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to the EU single market. 
The Common European Economic Space also sounds like a big idea, but so 
far only amounts to bilateral discussions between the EU and Russia over a 
loosely defined agenda of trade and market policy issues, without even 
mentioning the idea of tariff-free trade.  
WTO rules restrict the free-trade agreements of its member states to other 
states that are also members of the WTO. This restriction already places an 
important constraint  on Europe, since  neither Russia nor Ukraine  is yet a 
member. The case of Russia in particular is stuck over the level of tariffs at 
which Russia would be bound in acceding to the WTO, and the degree to 
which Russia’s internal energy prices for industrial uses are aligned on world 
prices. It is not yet clear how or when these differences may be overcome. In 
the meantime, the official EU-Russian talks on creating a Common European 
Economic Space can hardly progress. After two years of discussions, the 
Concept Paper that the EU and Russia adopted in November 2003 covers a 
wide range of topics, including regulatory standards for trade in goods and 
services for  virtually all products, conditions for the establishment and 
operation of companies, and related aspects of the movement of persons (see 
extracts in Annex  E).  The Concept Paper has been criticised for not 
corresponding realistically to the priorities of either party.
29 Indeed, it makes 
no operational or binding commitments. The bilateral working group that 
produced the Concept Paper has to resort to inviting the summit to give them 
a new mandate to draw up an action plan. The two parties have evidently not 
been able to make progress on the substance so far. 
The EEA, however, has strong content, since the non-EU states are accepting 
nearly all the EU single market rules in exchange for virtually complete and 
guaranteed market access.
30 If the term ‘Common European Economic 
Space’ were to be taken at its face value and made into a reality it would 
mean extending the EEA model to the whole of Wider Europe.  
The European Free Trade Area is today reduced to EU-Swiss bilateral trade, 
and this organisation is otherwise administering the EEA. Switzerland has 
negotiated a set of sectoral agreements that give partial access to the EU’s 
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single market, on top of tariff-free trade. This model could be of interest for 
other trade partners (such as Russia) at a later stage.  
Turkey and the EU have gone further ahead in forming a customs union. 
This  is another  model  that  could be of interest to other trade partners  – 
especially the states of South-East Europe – ahead of EU accession. For the 
time being, the Balkan states are negotiating a matrix of bilateral free-trade 
agreements together, while proceeding with bilateral trade-liberalisation 
asymmetrically with the EU, with hideous complications over rules of origin. 
For this dense collection of small states, a huge advantage would be gained 
from a sweeping simplification of the trade system, especially for the weak 
states of the region where customs procedures are a well-known basis for 
corruption. A radical model would be to form an extended customs union of 
the EU, Turkey and all the states of South-East Europe that lie between them. 
This enlarged customs union would  also  make it possible to scrap the 
complicated apparatus of rules of origin. The states of the region could adopt 
the EU’s common external tariff as a first step, in advance of entering into 
symmetrical tariff-free trade with the EU. Further, this model would resolve 
once  and for all such problems as the tensions  between Serbia and 
Montenegro over their external tariff regime.  
For Russia, there remains the question of compatibility of its interest in a 
Common European Economic Space with the EU, and its ideas for a customs 
union and an integrated single market with the CIS states. One initiative has 
been the EurAsian Economic Area (EAEA) for Russia with Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. If the EAEA were to become a 
customs union, then an EU-Russian free-trade agreement would have to be 
extended to the EAEA. If the CEES came to mean Russia adopting many EU 
norms, these would have to apply to the rest of the EAEA, which could, 
however, be too difficult for some states (e.g. Tajikistan) to implement.  
Russian President Vladimir Putin made some statements to CIS leaders in the 
spring of 2003 proposing the idea of a ‘Greater Europe’ economic space, 
which would bring together both the EU and CIS. But there is no evidence 
that the idea had been thought through seriously. At a CIS summit in Yalta in 
September, Russia announced a new C ommon  Economic Space (CES), 
consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine,  as an attempt to 
create a more compact and operational body than the EAEA,  which 
presumably is found to be giving disappointing results. Yet this CES 
agreement was immediately accompanied by disclaimers and controversy 
from Ukraine, with remarks stressing that the CES should not impede 
Ukraine’s integration with the EU.  At some point, however, the two 
processes would become incompatible, with the need to choose  between 
convergence on EU policies or on those of Russia. For example, Ukraine 
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wider customs union was created that combines them all. Russia clearly does 
not envisage a common European customs union, but favours instead 
modelling its CIS initiatives (EAEA or CES, or both) as its version of the 
EU.
31 Ukrainian reticence over the CES plan is revealed in an opinion poll of 
an elite group (see Box 2). 
Box 2. Ukraine between a rock and a hard place* 
What is your opinion of the ultimate aim of the CES? 
1. Free-trade area – 16% 
2. Customs union – 23% 
3. Economic union – 19% 
4. Common market – 9% 
5. Monetary union – 4% 
6. Hard to say – 19% 
What is the maximum appropriate limit of Ukraine’s integration with CES? 
1. Free trade – 43% 
2. Customs union – 2% 
3. Economic union – 6% 
4. Common market – 6% 
5. Monetary union – 0% 
6. Integration into CES is unnecessary – 36% 
How would the CES affect integration with the EU? 
1. It steps up integration with the EU – 2% 
2. It makes integration with the EU impossible – 30% 
3. It slows down integration with the EU – 49% 
4. It does not affect integration with the EU – 15% 
5. It makes integration with the EU unnecessary – 0% 
What, in your opinion, are the prospects for the CES? 
1. It will become an efficient economic unity – 6% 
2. It will suffer the fate of the other CIS economic projects – 57%  
3. It will become a tool for post-Soviet area reintegration – 17% 
4. It will be transformed into another, more realistic project – 17% 
5. It will be a bridge for membership of the EU – 0% 
6. Hard to say – 4% 
* Results of a poll of 53 Ukrainian experts in foreign policy on the Common Economic 
Space (CES) agreement signed at Yalta on 18 September 2003 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine.  
Source: Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (CPCFPU), Policy 
Paper No. 15, November 2003 (retrievable from www.foreignpolicv.org.ua). 
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The EU is embarking on free-trade agreements with much of the Greater 
Middle East. With the Mediterranean partner states of the Barcelona Process 
the EU has negotiated a set of free-trade agreements for implementation from 
2010. The EU is also negotiating a multilateral free-trade agreement with the 
six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which have themselves 
created a customs union. Following the Iraq war, the US has immediately 
proposed the idea of a free-trade agreement between the US and a similar 
Middle East grouping by 2013, from Morocco to the  Persian  Gulf, thus 
combining both the ‘Barcelona’  group  and the Gulf states. These two 
programmes could, in principle, fit neatly alongside each other. 
The World Bank is working with the EU on a joint programme for market 
reforms in the Mediterranean. Three initial studies – on electricity markets, 
transport and the service sector in general – all aim at preparing the EU’s 
southern Mediterranean partners to start moving along the track of the EU’s 
internal market project. The essence of  the project  is to pursue domestic 
regulatory reform and liberalisation, alongside external liberalisation and 
regional integration.
32 
Work in this field also suggests the idea of a Greater Euro-Mediterranean 
economic space, from Russia to the Mediterranean. Of course the least 
advanced states of this vast area should not be expected to adopt the EU’s 
acquis wholesale, as the accession candidates are obliged to do. Nonetheless 
it leads to the important task of technical and political prioritisation for the 
least advanced states, to identify those parts of the EU’s internal market 
agenda that are most relevant and feasible for the states in question, as the 
World Bank studies are beginning to do. 
How could these multiple systems and ideas in the trade and market domains 
be rationalised?  
§  Given that free trade is on the agenda  between the EU and the 
European CIS states and Mediterranean countries, one proposition 
could be to design a Pan-European Free Trade Area (PEFTA). This 
initiative  would couple multilateral tariff-free trade with common 
adoption of the pan-European rules of origin. Membership of 
                                                 
32 See D. Mueller-Jentsch (2001), The Development of Electricity Markets in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Area, World Bank Technical Paper No. 491, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.; see also D. Mueller-Jentsch (2002), Transport Policies for the 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, World Bank Technical Paper No. 527, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C.; and also D. Mueller-Jentsch, Deeper Integration 
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PEFTA would be an open-ended option for all  the  states of the 
Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East.  
§  For non-tariff barriers and single market regulation, the EU could 
propose that the existing bodies of EFTA and EEA be mandated to 
design a long-term process  by which  the EU single market  is 
progressively extended to the Wider Europe. This effort could draw 
on the Swiss model as well as the current EU-Russian discussions. 
In essence, the task would be to design a modular and multi-stage 
approach to single-market  harmonisation and mutual recognition, 
identifying the steps that would initially deliver advantages without 
the  excessive burdens of harmonisation. Since the World Bank is 
already bringing its development expertise to bear on this question 
for the southern Mediterranean region, the overall aim could be to 
work out a set of models for submission at the political level, where 
the EU would have to take the major responsibility. These models 
could result in redefining the EEA as a multi-stage, multi-modular 
concept for a genuine, common European Economic Area. 
§  The PEFTA and redefined EEA together could be recognised as a 
single Common European Economic Area project.  
§  The EU could further propose to expand the EU-Turkish customs 
union to include the whole of  South-East Europe, within, for 
example, five years.  This  expansion  would go together with 
institutional assistance for customs services and border guards.  
§  The EU and the US should consider jointly proposing the formation 
of consistent free-trade areas to the states of the Mediterranean and 
Middle East, in  which the Mediterranean and  Persian  Gulf states 
would form one large free-trade area among themselves, in addition 
to bilateral negotiations with the EU and US.  
Euro and monetary regimes 
The euro could become one of the most potent, unifying factors of the Wider 
Europe, progressively displacing the dollar as a parallel currency for trade 
and private savings, beyond the more restrictive extension of the eurozone. 
As the predominant and completely convertible currency of Europe, the euro 
would know no frontiers across the Wider Europe, at least in the private 
sector.  
For the governments of the Wider Europe, there is already a well-identified 
hierarchy of monetary regimes relative to the euro: currencies floating freely 
against the euro; currencies semi-pegged against the euro; currencies rigidly 
pegged to the euro with the aid of currency board regimes (Estonia, Bulgaria, 
Bosnia); micro-states that are fully euroised (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 39 
and  the  Vatican);  and some sub-state entities that are also fully  euroised 
(Montenegro and Kosovo). Some of the micro-states (Monaco and San 
Marino) have also been authorised by the EU to issue their own euro coins as 
collectors’ items, compensating for the loss of bank note seigniorage. 
The EU finance ministers (in  euro formation) as well as the European 
Central Bank could become more open and constructive in the positions they 
adopt towards the newly acceding  member states as well as those in the 
Wider Europe. For the moment, the EU has adopted an ‘exclusive’ rather 
than ‘inclusive’ position, if not dogma. This stance is seen in two examples.  
First, Commissioner  Pedro  Solbes has announced that the criteria for 
accession to the eurozone for the newly acceding member states includes two 
years of service within narrow 2.25% fluctuation bands. It is now, however, 
virtually the consensus among economists that there are only  two  robust 
exchange-rate regimes, fixed  and floating. A return to 2.25% fluctuation 
margins is an invitation for volatile, short-term capital flows and monetary 
instability, or very costly stabilisation episodes.
33 To force such a regime on 
the newly acceding countries is economic-policy masochism. The Maastricht 
criteria for budget deficits and inflation have their rationale, but the 
exchange-rate test should best be dropped or reverted to the prior 
requirement of the wide 15% fluctuation-margin  for  participation in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism, which the founding members of the  eurozone 
applied to themselves.  
Second, in its Wider Europe paper, the Commission simply ignores the euro, 
as if  it  were of no relevance. In reality,  preparation for euroisation  has 
already shown itself to be a useful instrument of support for some very weak 
states (i.e.  the  Balkan protectorates).  This option deserves open-minded 
discussion. The recently successful, full dollarisation of Ecuador is a relevant 
example from the Americas, as are the long-dollarised cases of Panama and 
Puerto Rico. 
The argument about the optimal timing for accession to the eurozone remains 
a matter of balancing costs and benefits. There is no presumption that all of 
Europe should euroise as soon as possible, especially during the transition 
process of the former communist economies.  Nevertheless, EU Wider 
Europe policy should be looking sympathetically at all available means to 
help strengthen the governance of the weak states of Wider Europe and 
euroisation can be one of these.  
                                                 
33 See C. Wyplosz (2003), “Who’s Afraid of Euroisation?”, CEPS Commentary, 
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Transport networks  
The planning work of the Pan-European Conference of Transport Ministers 
has already resulted in a coherent transport map of the Wider Europe with 
ten corridors for road or rail routes, or both. These corridors and networks 
extend from the EU15 to the east, first through the newly acceding states. 
Then the corridors stretch on to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the 
Balkans. These planning maps also link across the Black Sea to the Traceca 
network that  passes  through the Caucasus to Central Asia. Once  work is 
identified in the planning maps,  it  goes ahead with detailed project 
preparation with the participation of the EU, EIB and EBRD for investment 
financing. EU financing for these corridors come from different EU 
instruments, all with different rules, which makes coordination difficult. It is 
indeed an issue for Wider Europe policy to rationalise these administrative 
complications. 
As part of the next phase, the EU is now preparing for the enlargement of its 
members from 25 to 27, with the upgrading of the corridors that go though 
the Balkans to Bulgaria and Romania. Thereafter the focus will turn to the 
corridors going to Russia through Belarus and Ukraine. Semi-pariah Belarus 
is unlikely to benefit from EU investment funding for the time being. 
Nevertheless t he request from Ukraine,  for EIB funding for the corridors 
going through its territory, is already an issue. Russia has requested that the 
corridor that which goes from Berlin to Moscow and on to Nijni Novgorod 
(number 2) be extended to Ekaterinburg, with eligibility for EIB investment 
financing. The result could become the first tangible expression of Charles 
de Gaulle’s old idea of a Europe that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
The pan-European transport corridors represent the geographical map of the 
Wider Europe  par excellence. Territorial continuity  is, of course,  a  key 
quality. Political sub-classification and discrimination  among individual 
states along any given corridor make no sense, only damaging the interests of 
the corridor stakeholders as a whole. The EU has so far been reluctant to 
make financing from the EIB  available  beyond the accession candidate 
states, but this could change with clearer development of the Wider Europe 
policy. The Commission’s Communication curiously makes no reference to 
the Pan-European Transport Network. It does, however, mention the Trans-
Euro-Mediterranean Networks, with  their  associated EIB financing 
(including the new Facility for  Euro-Mediterranean Investment and 
Partnership – FEMIP).  
Energy  
This subject is the single most important factor that brings together both the 
Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East. Europe needs oil and gas 
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organisation of policy is a complex game shared by monopolistic or 
cartelistic producers and monopsonistic buyers. Russia enjoys the dominant 
market position as Europe’s external natural gas supplier (80% in 2002),
34 
and the former Soviet Union (Russia and Caspian states) now  leads the 
Middle East as the primary supplier of Europe’s oil imports (214 and 161 
million tonnes respectively). Europe is buying 100% of Russia’s natural gas 
exports and 81% of the former Soviet Union’s oil exports. Thus Europe is 
now taking only 18% of the Middle East’s oil, on  which Asia is more 
dependent.
35 The increase in Russian oil production in 2002 was substantial, 
sufficient to satisfy the entire growth of world consumption in that year. 
OPEC’s market share is gradually declining from a peak of 42% in 1998 to 
38% in 2002.   
The main attempt to create a pan-European energy organisation has been the 
European Energy Charter initiative, resulting in the Energy Charter Treaty of 
2000. This  project was initially an ambitious yet vague idea, launched in 
1995 by the then Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. The general idea was 
to cement together the interests of the EU and Russia in the energy sector. At 
the level of the membership m ap,  the questions  of whether the US and 
Middle East states would participate remained open. In the event, the US 
withdrew from the negotiations, arguing that some provisions would be 
inconsistent with US federal law. Russia has signed but not ratified the 
Energy Charter Treaty, with reservations expressed in the Duma.  
At the level of policy content, the Energy Charter Treaty largely defers to the 
WTO for the rules of trade, b ut it seeks to improve the conditions for 
investment and the transit of oil and gas. The draft transit protocol aims at 
regulating the conditions for pipeline transit, with major examples being the 
routing of Russian supplies through Ukraine, of Caspian supplies through the 
Caucasus and of Persian Gulf supplies across to Mediterranean or Red Sea 
ports. Russia is expected to sign the transit protocol after long hesitations and 
internal divisions of interest; however, it would become legally binding only 
after ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty itself. Meanwhile, Ukraine and 
the Caucasus states have ratified the Treaty and will sign the transit protocol.  
The Energy Charter Treaty will become, as and when Russia ratifies it, a 
significant element of pan-European multilateralism, its Treaty provisions 
being legally binding on all participants. In addition, the EU and Russia have 
                                                 
34 See British Petroleum (2003), BP Statistical Review of World Energy, BP, 
London, June; Russia supplied 128 billion cubic metres (bcm) to Europe in 2002, 
compared with 31 bcm from Algeria (and 126 bcm of internal EU/EEA 
supplies).  
35 See British Petroleum, ibid.; in this paragraph, Europe is defined as the EU25, 
plus EEA, the Balkans and Turkey. 42 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
initiated a bilateral energy dialogue. The EU has also initiated a dialogue 
with the  Persian  Gulf states in the framework of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. The Gulf states and Iran are already observers of the Energy Charter 
Treaty and may become full members later. The general model could become 
one of a single, multilateral treaty for the whole of the Wider Europe and the 
Greater Middle East together, supported by strategic bilateral dialogues 
between the EU and Russia, as well as the EU and the Persian Gulf.  
Regional energy networks, notably for electricity, also figure on the agenda 
of the natural geographical regions. Thus the Baltic and Black Seas have 
agendas for electricity-ring integration,  which the Baltic states have 
advanced faster than the Black Sea states so far.  
Environment 
At the level of the Wider Europe, the main issues are between the EU and 
Russia bilaterally, both for global warming and nuclear safety. On global 
warming, the EU’s main concern has been to draw Russia into the Kyoto 
Protocol, since Russia is both a major polluter by global standards and a 
banker of very large CO2 savings accumulated during the 1990s, which can 
enter into global-emissions trading schemes. Russia’s intentions for ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol (or not) remain unclear at the time of writing. Ukraine is 
the next most important partner for the same reasons.  For nuclear safety, 
Russia similarly holds the largest stock of dangerous materials, including the 
rusting nuclear submarines of the Murmansk area. A major cooperation 
agreement in this field was signed in May 2003 by Russia, the EU, Norway 
and the US. Thus far, the Wider Europe of the environment appears to be a 
largely bilateral EU-Russia affair.  
Nevertheless, the setting of norms and regulations for products, water and air 
pollution is  a further  dimension to environmental policy.  This mass of 
detailed, regulatory policy overlaps heavily with the regulation of internal 
markets. It is therefore appropriate to put this aspect of environment policy 
alongside trade and market policies, as already discussed. The EEA and 
candidate states will be adopting all the EU norms, so a common European 
economic space will need to include environmental aspects.  
Environmental policy also has its natural regional aspects, notably for river 
basins and regional seas that know no political borders. The Barents, Baltic, 
Black, Caspian and Mediterranean Seas all see significant environmental 
programmes, as also do some major river basins, for example the Danube 
and the Rhine.  
Environmental policy is thus a policy domain that has to be split up into 
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to the efficient geographical-political level of governance. In this manner, the 
Wider Europe becomes just one level of a multi-tier governance structure.  
Economic aid 
The EU  has launched  a comprehensive set of economic aid instruments, 
which are intended to support the policy spaces under discussion here. The 
aid instruments include grant  programmes (called Cards for the Balkans, 
Tacis for the CIS states and Meda for the Mediterranean), investment loans 
from the European Investment Bank and macroeconomic loans (only made 
very selectively and usually in association with the International Monetary 
Fund).  
The statistics of aid commitments over the period  of  1995 to  2002, as 
presented in Annex B, speak clearly of the prioritisation given to the various 
regions of the Wider Europe. There is a huge range in the relative importance 
of these programmes, which may be summarised in the average per capita 
aid receipts  accumulated over eight years  by the states  of the regions 
identified for policy purposes (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Average per capita aid receipts accumulated in 1995–2002 
(in euros) 
Region  Aid per capita 
Balkans (SAA states of former Yugoslavia and Albania) 
Mediterranean (South and East Mediterranean) 
European CIS 
Central Asian CIS and Afghanistan 
Persian Gulf states 
246 
23 
9 
4 
1 
Source: European Commission. 
Two explanatory factors about aid has been distributed seem to stand out: 
first, the proximity of the region to the core of the EU, and second, the need 
for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. The former Yugoslavia 
scores high on both accounts. The Mediterranean partners receive on average 
only  10% of the amount  given to  the Balkans. T he European CIS states 
receive half as much as the Balkans, and the Central Asian CIS states receive 
half as much  as the European CIS.  The rich  Persian  Gulf states come 
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Individual post-conflict (or outstanding conflict) cases are privileged: the 
per-capita aid figures during the same period as above are €465 for Bosnia, 
€553 for Kosovo and €153 for Palestine. In 2002, Afghanistan alone quickly 
overtook the scale of aid to all of the Central Asian CIS states. 
For  comparison, the annual national income of the regions of the  Wider 
Europe tends to be in the range of €1,500–2,000 per annum. This means that 
the highest levels of distribution of EU aid (for the Balkans and Palestine) 
are certainly macroeconomically significant. If attached to conditions, such 
amounts may become a serious incentive for the recipient to follow policies 
favoured by the EU and international financial organisations. For the other 
regions and states of the  Wider Europe, however, the amounts are very 
marginal macroeconomically, and for effectiveness, these have to relate to 
much narrower and precisely targeted objectives.  
3.3.3  Justice and home affairs 
Recent years have seen major trends in EU policy in the broad domain of 
justice and home affairs, particularly in its external aspects, in two respects: 
first, there has been a transfer of  policy-making and legislation to the EU 
level, which includes the harmonisation of rules for immigration, visas and 
asylum;
36 and second, there has been an externalisation of ‘internal’ security 
policy  in the wake of  11 September, with the heightened priority  of 
combating terrorism and illegal trafficking of all kinds.
37  
These policies naturally t end towards a distinction  between the Wider 
Europe and the Greater Middle East, even if the principles of the policies are 
generally expressed in non-discriminatory terms. This strategic bargain with 
the Wider Europe is taking shape. The EU is setting standards of law and 
order as a reference. The EU controls its frontiers with increasingly unified 
protection at the level of visas, immigration, border controls, asylum and re-
admission agreements with third countries. The EU offers openness to the 
citizens o f the Wider Europe as and when the states in question move 
sufficiently towards EU standards. In the process, these states come to serve 
as a buffer zone between the EU and the more troublesome neighbourhoods 
beyond. By  comparison with the  eurozone, EU accession does not mean 
immediate or automatic access to the Schengen area.  
                                                 
36 See J. Apap and S. Carrera (2003), Progress and Obstacles in the Area of 
Justice and Home Affairs in an Enlarging Europe, CEPS Working Document 
No. 194, CEPS, Brussels, June. 
37 See  J.  Apap and S. Carrera (2003),  Maintaining  Security within  Borders: 
Towards a Permanent State of Emergency in the EU?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 
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On the other hand there is already the precedent of the EEA states that have 
fully acceded to the Schengen acquis without EU membership. The EU is 
now moving in the direction of common coastal (maritime) border-security 
and common land border-services, both of which can reach into the non-EU 
states of the Wider Europe. It is discussing a draft Commission proposal for 
a new European agency for managing its external borders (European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders), 
which would be legally based on Schengen jurisdiction. There have also 
been proposals for a European Border Guard or a European Border Police.
38  
Within the Wider Europe the incentive of obtaining visa-free access to the 
EU is of huge importance. The decision to grant visa-free access is basically 
a bilateral matter between the EU and the individual third country, and offers 
an important instrument of conditionality.  Yet within the  Wider Europe, 
governments may not always  the  masters of the situation. Changes in 
citizenship by individuals, unintended by governments, can become a 
variable, forcing changes to the map of the Wider Europe. At issue here are 
the possibilities of citizens coming from poor and conflict-ridden states to 
acquire a second citizenship of a motherland, which may be a stronger state 
(e.g. Russia or Turkey) or an actual or prospective EU member state. It is no 
coincidence that these possibilities exist and are being exploited in all of the 
areas of secessionist conflict of the Wider Europe. Many Moldovans can 
become Romanian citizens. Many Transniestrians are Russian citizens. 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians  can  become Russian citizens. Northern 
Cypriots become either ‘Greek’ Cypriots or Turks. Macedonians can become 
Bulgarians, with dual-citizenship. Many Bosnian Croats can become 
Croatian citizens, with dual-citizenship. Bosnian Serbs can do the same with 
Serbian citizenship.
39 The people of Nagorno Karabakh are now Armenian 
citizens. The  case  of Israelis now obtaining  a  second EU  citizenship has 
already been mentioned.  
The message from these cases is that if the EU or Russia (or both) do not go 
to these conflict-ridden areas to resolve the problems effectively, then the 
peoples will come to them. Even where the conflicts are overcome, there are 
inescapable policy implications. For example, visa policies of the 
EU/Schengen area that seek to discriminate between states that are judged as 
                                                 
38 A study group led by Italy, with Belgian, F rench, German and Spanish 
participation, has developed this idea in detail in a  Feasibility Study for the 
Setting up of a European Border Police, final report, sponsored by the European 
Commission OISIN programme, Rome, May 2002. 
39 Bosnian citizens can have dual nationality. Bosnian Croats can obtain Croatian 
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either  suitable  or non-suitable  for the visa-free list can be rendered 
ineffective. Political frontiers within ethnically complex regions fail, since 
the spill over between states is too great. In the Balkan case, these facts push 
in favour of a unified visa and movement-of-persons regime for the region. 
The EU encourages the Balkans to form a visa-free region, analogous to 
regional free trade. In the Caucasus, if the international community does not 
mount a more effective conflict-resolution process, the outcome of the frozen 
conflicts  becomes secession and annexation by change of citizenship (to 
Russian for Abkhazians and South Ossetians, and to Armenian for the people 
of Nagorno Karabakh).  
The EU list of countries for which visas are currently required is reported in 
Annex A. The EU’s visa frontier today is with the CIS states and the Arab 
world, all of whom require visas. The European CIS countries are beginning 
to enter the field of discussion over at least partial measures to ease visa 
restrictions. The Commission’s Wider Europe paper shows a willingness to 
look for measures to ease restrictions for third-country nationals living in 
border regions (e.g. Ukrainian citizens, Russian citizens from Kaliningrad 
and other regions bordering the Baltic states). The most recent EU-Russia 
summit has identified visa-free travel as a long-tem objective, which would 
mean be a fundamental step in Russia’s Europeanisation. For these cases, the 
incentive and conditions are clear in the most general terms. Visa-free travel 
into the EU can be a plausible objective, on condition that the quality of law 
and order in these states approaches European standards. But the EU has yet 
to tell its neighbours precisely what has to be done to achieve visa-free 
status.
40 
The migration policy of the EU now seems to be on the move. Economic and 
demographic pressures in favour of a more positive migration  stance are 
translating into policy. The Thessaloniki European Council of June  2003 
reflects this, in preparing for an ‘EU Integration Policy’ (meaning  in this 
context t he integration of the third-country individual into the EU labour 
market and society). The emerging line of policy discourse seems to be that 
the EU is going to have to absorb many more migrants in the decades ahead 
in any case, so it is best to start now  to prepare the conditions for their 
successful assimilation into the host member states. This evolving policy is 
framed in universal terms, rather than discriminating between the regions of 
the world.  Nevertheless one can expect that Wider Europe states will be 
well-placed to profit from such openings, combined with prospects of visa-
free travel into the EU.  
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The European Council of Thessaloniki in June 2003 was also notable for its 
emphasis on the fight against terrorism, with an explicit reference to 
‘extreme fundamentalism’. A comprehensive array of measures is being 
prepared or adopted, such as threat analyses by region and state, measures 
against the financing of terrorism, technical assistance to third countries, etc. 
Sadly for the Greater Middle East, the distinction with the Wider Europe is 
evident. The Wider Europe has disorderly and criminalised areas, but it is not 
a source or location of extreme fundamentalism (Chechnya may, however, 
be the exception). There is a tendency for the Wider Europe to be regarded as 
a buffer zone by EU interior ministers, to protect the core of Europe from 
terrorist threats from the Greater Middle East.  
3.3.4  Foreign and security policies 
The Iraq war,  a  sequel to the Afghanistan war and  the events of  11 
September 2001, has become an epochal event for the EU’s gradual and 
painstaking attempts to build up common foreign, security and defence 
policies. It has shattered some illusions that the EU was already on a well-
defined track in this arena.  
Such illusions may be forgiven for two reasons. The first is that the EU is 
actually progressing in assembling the mechanisms of an integrated foreign, 
security and (to an initial, small degree) defence policy. The plans to create 
Rapid Reaction Forces, consisting of both military and civilian police, have 
been advancing. Temporary political roadblocks have been overcome (e.g. 
the Turkish-Greek disagreement over the conditions for the ESDP to use 
NATO assets). The first military operation has begun in Macedonia. The first 
police operation has begun in Bosnia. A second military operation has just 
begun in the Congo. Further military peacekeeping operations are  being 
discussed,  e.g. for Bosnia and  perhaps  for  Moldova/Transniestria. Other 
operations could appear on the horizon, for example in the Caucasus and the 
Middle East. The military Airbus and Galileo satellite projects are  going 
ahead. At the higher political level, the European Convention developed an 
agreed position in favour of double-hatting the present positions of the high 
representative for CFSP and commissioner for foreign relations with the title 
of EU foreign minister. The incumbent will have the hugely important role of 
combining the presidency of the Council of foreign ministers with control of 
the Commission’s executive functions.  
The second reason  relates to the Bush administration’s strident moves in 
unilateralist, militarist and  so-called  ‘democratic-imperialist’ directions 
because of the attacks of 11 September 2001. Some say with hindsight that 
they could see this coming, or that the events of 11 September triggered the 
epochal change that had been long in the making, in view of both the build-48 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
up of US military superiority across the world and what is now recognised as 
the long-gestating threat of Islamic fundamentalist hyper-terrorism. 
The split over Iraq has been so deep and grave as to overwhelm (at least 
temporarily) the EU’s incremental steps of progress in foreign  policy-
making. What the big split between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe shows is that 
while the EU has a clear view of what it is doing on its home ground of 
Europeanisation processes, it has no common view of the big, external, 
global issues in the presence of an aggressively unilateralist and militarist 
America.  
While the world was still wondering whether the EU could recover from the 
split over Iraq, the EU institutions actually started responding constructively. 
Instead of a knock-out blow, the Iraqi  crisis may prove  to be a catalyst, 
without which the progress now in sight would not have emerged, at least not 
so quickly.  Mr  Solana responded to an invitation to devise a European 
security strategy by submitting a document entitled A Secure Europe in a 
Better World  to the Thessaloniki European Council in June  2003, which 
received immediate and unanimous support within the EU and from across 
the Atlantic. The document  clearly  presents the new security threats: 
terrorism, organised crime and WMD proliferation, which take the top three 
places. It supports regional and international multilateralism as the key to 
legitimacy in a rule-based international order. It argues for an EU that would 
be more coherent and more capable: “We need to develop a strategic culture 
that fosters early, rapid and where necessary, robust intervention. We should 
think particularly of o perations involving  both military and civilian 
capabilities…We should think of a wider spectrum of missions. In addition 
to the Petersberg tasks, this  might include joint disarmament operations, 
support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. 
The last of these would be part of broader institution building…In a crisis 
there is no substitute for unity of command.” The European Council 
welcomed this document and mandated Mr Solana to develop it further by 
December. The same meeting adopted a declaration on WMD, stating its 
willingness in principle to use  “as a last resort, coercive measures in 
accordance with the UN Charter”.  Nevertheless, the second Solana 
document, the European Security Strategy of December 2003 (included as 
Annex C), uses more bland language: “preventative engagement can avoid 
more serious problems in the future”.
41 
Given the snail’s pace of prior evolution of the C ommon  Foreign and 
Security  Policy (CFSP) and ESDP, these developments are almost 
revolutionary. Such progress is also why the EU’s Wider Europe doctrine 
needs a clearer conceptualisation and then operationalisation. It has to be 
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spilt into two departments. First, there is  the Wider Europe department, 
where the Europeanisation paradigm can dominate as the US gradually fades 
into the background as a foreign policy actor in the region. Second, there is 
the department of the  Greater Middle East,  where the Europeanisation 
paradigm may still be interesting but is certainly not dominant, alongside the 
massive projection of military and diplomatic power by US.  
The key challenge for European foreign policy planners thus becomes how to 
envisage a new order for the Greater Middle East, to  which the EU can 
contribute, but where success (real success over basic objectives, not just 
tokenism) is only conceivable if there is coherence with what the US is 
doing, and also with Russia for some parts of the map (the former Soviet 
Union states of Central Asia and the Caucasus). We return to these issues in 
more detail in section 4.2.   
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Chapter 4 
Systemic and Strategic Aspects 
he open issues in this discourse are systemic for the Wider Europe, but 
strategic for the Greater Middle East.  
By this it is meant that the strategic idea for the Wider Europe – that 
of European identity and progressive ‘Europeanisation’ of the politics, 
economics and civil societies of the whole continent – is effectively settled. 
The EU is the  leading actor  there  and the US  as an actor is  gradually 
withdrawing. Equally, Europe is a continent within  which indigenous 
security threats are also fading away or becoming fringe affairs. The open 
question here is how to organise the Europeanisation process in the Wider 
Europe where the play of EU accession negotiations is not possible or 
desired. This is a systemic question. 
For the Greater Middle East, however, the open issues are  first of all 
strategic. The general Western hope is that the whole region  will become 
more democratic and modern, and this seems to be the desire of the peoples 
of the region too. But whether and how the West should go about this is a 
huge  strategic question. The spectrum of opinions is so wide that it only 
emphasises the strategic uncertainties  between those who say that the 
external powers cannot and should not try to fashion these societies, and 
Washington’s democratic imperialists, who have advocated and pursued the 
path of regime change by war. From an EU perspective, two things are clear. 
First, the societies of the Greater Middle East do not have  a  European 
identity to the point of legitimising a full Europeanisation process. Second, 
the US is seen throughout most of the region as the leading external actor. 
Although the EU is equally present there, it cannot hope to achieve decisive 
results unless EU and US policies are sufficiently convergent. As and when 
there is such a convergence of strategy, there may be scope for systemic 
region-building as well as state-building initiatives. 
4.1  The Wider Europe 
4.1.1  Common European House 
There are several institutional issues for each o f the common European 
policy spaces. What is the optimal geography or membership map for the 
activity? Should there be multi-tier structures with the regional level as well 
as higher levels? The global multilateral level is almost always present, but 
is there a need for initiatives bringing together both the Wider Europe and 
the Greater Middle East? What is the balance  between EU  leadership in 
terms of norms, resources and institutional organisations on the one hand, 
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compared  with the role of the international and European multilateral 
organisations? What role could there also be for the EU-Russian strategic 
partnership as a duopoly?  
With regard to European organisations such as the Council of Europe, the 
European Conference,  the  Organisation for  Economic  Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and OSCE, the European Commission’s paper offers 
little guidance, except vague words about these and other international 
organisations being engaged in the process. This lack of precision implies 
that the EU itself is the only common institutional structure of importance. 
The Council of Europe has serious qualifications for an important role in the 
Wider Europe and some drawbacks. On the one hand, its membership map is 
perfect. Its legal and political codification of the norms of the human and 
political dimension is admirable. Its Parliamentary Assembly and Court of 
Human Rights fit well into the new Wider Europe institutionally. On the 
other hand its inter-governmental structure at the level of the Committee of 
Ministers has become increasingly obsolete in the sense that the EU itself 
does not fit into this assembly of 40 states, which is a problem that will be 
further accentuated with the EU’s enlargement.  
Nevertheless, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe has drawn up a 
Memorandum, published in September 2003, to address these issues.
42 He 
proposes an associate-partnership relationship  between the EU and  the 
Council of Europe, with consideration to be given to the EU having – in all 
areas where its competences justify it – direct participation and voting rights 
in all activities and organs of the Council of Europe. Such participation could 
include, for example, involvement in the control mechanism of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, if the EU accedes to the Convention, as 
proposed in the draft  Constitutional Treaty drawn up by  Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing (and his ‘European Convention’). The EU institutions have not yet 
responded officially to these proposals, but to do so in a positive spirit could 
form part of the wider reform of the EU to adapt its relationships with 
relevant international organisations.  
The European Conference consists of ad hoc meetings that have been 
convened three times at the head of state/government level – in London in 
1998, in Nice in 2000 and in Athens in 2003 – and at other times at foreign 
ministerial level. Its purpose is to reduce the perception of excluding those 
European states  that are  not included in the EU enlargement. The list of 
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invited countries has steadily grown and the  most recent meeting has 
included 40 states: the EU and its candidates (15+10+3), plus the Western 
Balkans (+5), plus EEA/EFTA  members (+4), plus Ukraine, Moldova and 
Russia. It has thus widened to include the whole of the Council of Europe, 
except Belarus and the three South Caucasus states.  
The sessions of the European Conference typically last about three hours, 
which implies less than five minutes speaking time on average for the 40 
participants. The list of topics of common concern set out in the communiqué 
of the last meeting in Athens was comprehensive, covering virtually all the 
common  issues outlined above. But this semi-institutionalised conference 
amounts to no more than a very thin diplomatic gesture of inclusion by the 
EU towards the Wider Europe.  
If the European Conference is to continue, its geography could be tidied up 
once and for all, with participation the same as for the Council of Europe, 
thus including the South Caucasus, and leaving only Belarus out in the cold 
for the time being. The purpose of the meetings would be to serve as a forum 
to politically discuss all the common European issues and air the interests of 
the EU’s European partners, and to keep the adequacy of the institutional 
organisation of the specific common European policy spaces under review.  
The relationship  between the European Conference and the Council of 
Europe could be developed. It would still be the responsibility of the EU to 
convene meetings, thereby avoiding complications of form and mandate in 
relation to the Council of Europe itself. But the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Europe  would be among the guests (the chairman in office is 
present in any case as a national representative). The linkage between the 
European Conference and the Council of Europe would be especially 
appropriate since the EU and Council of Europe are now working together 
more purposefully, as the concluding statement of the latest Quadripartite 
meeting of the Council of Europe and EU shows.
43 The EU is funding joint 
programmes for democracy, legal institutions and civil society undertaken by 
the Council of Europe in non-EU member states. The Council of Europe’s 
centre of gravity as an institution is shifting towards becoming an implicit 
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th Quadripartite meeting took place on 17 June 2003. It was attended by 
the EU (Greek) Council presidency, the Director General of Enlargement for the 
European Commission, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Moldova, (who is also Chairman of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe). The concluding statement is 
itself an illustration of Wider Europe policy at work. Its headings include: EU 
Enlargement, Wider Europe  Neighbourhood, European Convention, South 
Caucasus, Moldova, South-East Europe, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia, 
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Wider Europe agency of the EU. Among the non-EU member states, the 
sense of  inclusion in Europe, which is critical for the process of 
Europeanisation, could be further enhanced. Some of the European 
Conference meetings could be  held  alongside meetings of the Council of 
Europe, at ministerial or senior official level.  
The European Conference  or the Council of Europe  (or both)  cannot, 
however, plausibly become a  well-developed mechanism of the Wider 
Europe. Most of the non-EU states are in a continuous spectrum of proximity 
to EU accession, which is a highly competitive process. A strengthening of a 
Wider Europe institution would be seen by front-runners in the competition 
as grouping them together with more distant candidates and reducing their 
chances of accession. Russia would  also  be unenthusiastic about b eing 
lumped together with many small and weak states,  thereby  reducing the 
potential of its duopolistic, strategic partnership with the EU. Those in the 
EU who actually wish to avoid further enlargement may see more attractions 
in the formula, but the EU as a whole has gone too far in its commitment to 
full membership of the whole of the Balkans to make this a legitimate option.  
Nonetheless, the Wider Europe’s overarching structure could start with an 
upgrading of the so-called ‘European Conference’. To mark the step, it could 
be more meaningfully renamed as the  ‘Pan-European Conference’ or the 
‘Common European Conference’, open to all Council of Europe  member 
states.
44 A core structure would be required, however, if the initiative is not 
to resemble the UN General Assembly without the UN Security Council. The 
Council of Europe and OSCE themselves also need core structures if they are 
to be more relevant for an EU of 25 or more member states.  
The Pan-European Conference  could be given a  coordinating  group 
consisting of the EU (and future foreign minister) and some combination of 
non-EU states and the relevant multilateral organisations. Here, one  could 
consider two main options. One option would be essentially political, centred 
on involving the major non-EU  states of Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. A 
second option would be essentially technical and centred on coordination 
with the multilateral organisations. 
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to that of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, the occasions of these 
meetings could also be used for Council of Europe decision-making purposes, 
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need for additional meetings (which would also help that organisation deliberate 
politically). There are already opportunities for sectoral ministers, for example of 
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Regarding the first option, Russia is already saying that it does not like the 
EU’s concept of Wider Europe, on the grounds that it prefers a combination 
of a bilateral relationship with the EU and a free hand to deepen CIS 
integration.
45 Turkey and Ukraine would  also  be cautious about the idea. 
Although they may be attracted to being privileged members of a European 
core group, they would also consider it a risk, in view of their EU-accession 
ambitions, to be grouped with Russia in this way. The main concerns for the 
EU would be whether Russia would be sincerely interested in building up a 
pan-European structure based firmly on common European norms, rather 
than just acceding to a mechanism that gives it quasi-veto powers over any 
initiative, such as seemed to be the Russian interest in the past in forming a 
European Security Council. For these and the other reasons mentioned, this 
first option looks implausible at present. 
The second option would  be to  build on the relationship that the EU has 
already been developing with several key multilateral organisations, notably 
the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, NATO and OSCE, regarding their operations in the Wider Europe. 
The IMF and  the  World Bank have  both increasingly operated in co-
financing mode with the EU in their respective fields  – with coordinated 
conditionality – in states and indeed sub-regions (notably South-East Europe 
and the Mediterranean) of the Wider Europe. For the World Bank, the EIB 
and EBRD are also important partners.  An a nalogous cooperation, non-
financial but addressing policy issues in legal-normative or security fields, 
has developed with the Council of Europe, NATO and OSCE. The 
coordinating  group for the  Pan-European Conference could see all the 
relevant organisations invited by the EU to prepare agendas.  
The coordinating group would prepare meetings of the full conference, but 
not have decision-making powers. The  Pan-European  coordinating  group 
would also supervise the work of separate coordinating groups for each of 
the seven common policy spaces, which would be structured in the same way 
with  the  EU and the relevant multilateral organisations. These sectoral 
coordinating groups include further specialised institutions, such as  the 
OECD, the Pan-European Conference of Transport Ministers, the Energy 
Charter, Europol for the justice and internal security area, etc.  
These coordinating groups would facilitate the exchanges between the Pan-
European Conference and the sectoral organisations,  thus helping to give 
coherence, synergies and impetus to the overall Wider Europe initiative. The 
EU institutions should take the initiative in submitting Green Papers on each 
of the policy domains, with supporting proposals to come from any of the 
relevant multilateral organisations or states of the Wider Europe.   
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A further institutional development could concern the place of the EU in the 
European multilateral organisations, particularly the Council of Europe, the 
OSCE and  the  OECD. The EU  could accede as full member of these 
organisations following the model already established for certain UN 
agencies, replacing the existing ad hoc arrangements.
46 The EU (foreign 
minister or his/her representative) would have full rights in these 
organisations, with the proviso of ‘no additionality’ for voting rights. This 
means that where an issue would come to a vote, the EU and its member 
states would decide themselves whether this is a matter for a collective EU 
position or  for  individual  member states to vote upon separately. In the 
former case, the EU representative casts a single vote with a weight of 15 (or 
25,  etc.), and the  member states do not vote. In the latter case, the EU 
representative does not vote.
47 The  previously mentioned proposals of the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe would be a more modest move 
in the same direction.
48 
In this way, combined with the rest of the Wider Europe structure, these 
valuable organisations would be rescued from their increasingly grave 
institutional obsolescence. But the more fundamental point is that the Wider 
Europe would be given an institutional structure matching the level of this 
strategic concept. For over a decade, Europe has sought the formula for its 
post-Communist, post-Soviet and enlarging-EU era. There are already a huge 
number of ad hoc arrangements. The Wider Europe concept could be the 
framework for better mobilising the extremely strong professional expertise 
of these organisations.  
4.1.2  Regional sub-structures 
A further tier to the governance of Wider Europe consists of regional 
organisations, notably for  the  Balkans and  South-East Europe, and the 
Barents, Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas. These regional organisations 
or networks can work on inherently regional issues and also serve as more 
compact forums for discussing the politics of the Wider Europe.  
                                                 
46 A recent Commission Communication surveys the relationship between the 
EU and the entire UN system in considerable detail, but concentrates on the 
principles of multilateralism and the modalities of more effective coordination 
rather than institutional innovations. See European Commission (2003d)  The 
European Union and the United Nations  – the choice of multilateralism, 
COM(2003) 536 final, 10 September.  
47 This is basically the model established for the EU’s participation in the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN and the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. 
48 See Council of Europe, op. cit.  56 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
The EU could be more consistent in favouring this regional approach. It was 
dragged into supporting the Northern Dimension by Finland and Sweden. It 
has been reluctant, however, to respond to invitations to participate actively 
in the BSEC organisation. Yet there are increasing reasons now to focus on 
the Black Sea, since the region not only has a natural economic geography, 
but also harbours a wide set of security concerns or threats (unresolved 
ethno-secessionist conflicts, conduits for trafficking and corridors for energy 
transport and pipelines). The EU  should therefore, in the Wider Europe 
context, reconsider its tepid attitude towards the overtures from BSEC. 
Given that these four seas and the Balkans (and possibly the Danube river 
basin) all have their regional networks, a question  remains as to  whether 
there is a case for multilateralising the relationship between the EU and the 
European CIS states. This case could have the logic that the Wider Europe 
breaks down into three major zones: the European CIS, the Balkans and the 
Mediterranean. Yet this would be superficial logic, since it forgets that the 
European CIS states have another hub in Russia, whereas the EU is the only 
hub for the Balkans and the Mediterranean. While relations between the EU 
and the European CIS states deepen every year, this hypothetical regional 
grouping still looks premature, given apprehensions that would exist around 
the table today over the nature of the triangular relationships between the 
EU, Russia and the other smaller states. For the European CIS states it seems 
that the geographical regional approach is more promising, i.e. to use the 
Barents Sea, Baltic Sea and Black Sea organisations, where old geo-political 
apprehensions are diluted by  a  common concern for more technical and 
economic issues (e.g. environmental and infrastructural).  
4.1.3  Systems for the extreme diversity of Wider Europe 
So far the approach has been to focus on common spaces, thus 
commonalities.  This  approach  has its value, yet the Wider Europe is 
extremely diverse in two respects. Its unit sizes range from the mega to the 
micro. The quality of the order in these states ranges from the most advanced 
to the least (in very weak states). The present section considers how a Wider 
Europe strategy on the part of the EU  could accommodate this huge 
diversity. We look at three cases: the mega-state Russia, which is moderately 
ordered, those small states and entities that are violently disordered, and 
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The elephant and the bear 
On an earlier occasion we have considered the co-habitation of the European 
elephant and the Russian bear,  both impressive beasts.
49 The political 
relationship  between the EU and Russia officially  aims at strategic 
partnership.  Although the Russian economy is still only relatively small, 
Russia is an actor way above its economic weight by virtue of its 
geographical coverage, energy resources and, under Mr Putin compared with 
former President Boris Yeltsin, firm  leadership. The EU-Russian bilateral 
agenda is important under virtually every heading or at least potentially so. 
Since Russia is still the centre of its own hub-and-spoke system (even if a 
reduced one) that overlaps in parts with the growing hub-and-spoke system 
of the EU,  the choice  between coordination and competition cannot be 
avoided.  
There is a search process going on to find an answer to this dilemma. At the 
institutional level, the half-yearly bilateral summits have been trying to find a 
formula to make better progress. The summit of May 2003 opted to explore 
the possible content of a Permanent Partnership Council, to improve upon 
the present Cooperation Council.  
What form could be given to the new Permanent Partnership Council? In 
general terms one could have in mind the analogue of the Franco-German 
axis within the EU, which are two entities of comparable size, with large 
political ambitions that establish a systematic closeness of de facto alliances 
on the wide agenda of European and international affairs. The partners have 
no common bilateral legislative space, but they heavily influence European 
policy at large and share many important projects. For the EU-Russian case it 
is clearly inappropriate to work according to the EU accession or association 
model, unlike most of the EU’s Wider Europe partners. The most important 
institutional innovation would be to upgrade the Cooperation Council into a 
joint Council of Ministers. At regular intervals, Russian cabinet ministers for 
all  the  topics of common concern  could meet together with their EU 
Commission counterparts, the EU Council presidency and the future foreign 
minister. The list of  ministers/commissioners attending, corresponding to 
real issues of common concern, would include foreign affairs, home affairs, 
economics and finance (plus the central bank governors), energy, 
environment, education/research/science, industry  and  trade and internal 
market. At times the topics of agriculture and fisheries would also be on the 
agenda. Defence w ould m ove onto the agenda in due course. Such a list 
means that the larger part of the Russian cabinet and EU Commission would 
be present. These joint sessions would be chaired at presidential level. The 
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bilateral summit meetings should also be given more time than the present 
three hours. There could be restricted sessions at presidential plus foreign 
ministerial levels, in parallel with the bilateral ministerial sessions and the 
plenary sessions of all. The parliamentary dimension could also be more 
amply developed. There are already joint committee meetings of the Duma 
and the European Parliament, and such relationships should be expected to 
gather increasing importance. 
One outcome of such collaboration and deepening of trust could be improved 
coordination to handle problems of the overlapping near-abroads, including 
the weak states and unresolved conflicts of the Caucasus and Moldova. We 
explore possible systemic solutions  to these conflicts  in the next section. 
Both Russia and the EU would like to see stability and more order in these 
states and secessionist entities, yet sufficient trust and transparency has not 
yet emerged to really work together for solutions. The legacy of  the  old 
sphere-of-influence attitudes has not evaporated and indeed sees some 
resurgence on the Russian side.  Nevertheless,  a great advantage could at 
some stage emerge for Russia in the shape of an EU contribution towards 
resolving the Chechnya problem.  
The violently disordered small states and entities 
The EU has thought in terms of concentric circle models, according to which 
the responsibilities and commitments of the EU diminish as a function of 
geographical  or political distance  (or both)  from the EU.  This approach, 
however, is now changing, given that the most acute problems of the Wider 
European space arise among the weak, conflictual or even failed states of the 
Wider Europe’s outer periphery from the Balkans to the Caucasus, including 
Moldova (and not neglecting the unresolved problem of Northern Cyprus).  
Official discourse often keeps the discussions of solutions to ethno-
secessionist conflicts to two basic variants: either mutually agreed secession 
and recognised independent statehood, or, where there is no agreement 
between the two parties, the search for a federative solution within a single 
state. The European periphery, however, seems to be heading towards far 
more complex and varied, multi-tier governance systems. A taxonomy is 
offered in Box  3, listing options for composite solutions for the ethno-
secessionist conflicts such as those seen in the Balkans and the Caucasus. 
Federation and confederation are well-established concepts, yet in their 
classic forms have not supplied adequate solutions for the unresolved 
conflicts of the European periphery. A more recent concept, enlarging the 
menu of possibilities, is the ‘common state’. Although this has no widely 
accepted definition, we regard it as a hybrid compromise between federation 
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international law, but the functional structure of government is actually more 
like a confederation, which works on selected common policies. 
Box 3. Taxonomy of solutions to ethno-secessionist conflicts 
One-tier – secession or unitary state(s) or both 
1.  Secession denied, unitary state prevails 
2.  Secession and independence, recognised internationally  
3.  De facto secession and independence, non-recognised  
Two-tier – with federative solutions 
4.  Federation (one state in international law, decentralised powers) 
5.  Asymmetric federation (one state, with autonomous entity) 
6.  Confederation (two states, some common policies) 
7.  Common state (one state, some common policies) 
Three-tier – with regional cooperation  
8.  Regional community of two or more states and sub-state entities) 
Four-tier – with the role of supranational or external powers  
9.  Multilateral, e.g. OSCE/UN/Council of Europe 
10. ‘Europeanisation’/‘Russification’/‘Pax Americana’ (for overarching 
protection/association/integration/annexation) 
11. Coalition/consortium/condominion, e.g. the EU and Russia or a troika of 
EU-RUS-US 
 
Yet the thin functions and powers of the common state may not be 
substantial enough to prevent centrifugal forces from predominating, with 
the common state then breaking apart. For this reason it may need to be 
combined with a tier of supranational or external power to hold it together. 
Serbia and Montenegro is a case where the model is being attempted with 
prospects of EU integration as the umbrella, although it is far from clear 
whether this case will prove sustainable. The UN Annan plan for Cyprus was 
another example, which was stalled again in March this year, but may still 
come about with full EU membership.
50 Russian Prime Minister Yevgenii 
Primakov has advocated common state solutions for Nagorno Karabakh and 
Transniestria. 
The disputed secessions of the European periphery have led to several de 
facto independent e ntities that lack international recognition,  such  as 
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Kosovo, Transniestria, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh and Northern Cyprus. 
It is typical, however, of these cases that the seceding party is not able to 
defend itself or may be perceived to be a threat to others. Therefore the role 
of a third party may be crucial in some form or other – in the manner of 
protectorate, association, integration or annexation (see Box 4). 
Also popular with the international community is the idea that conflictual 
regions should not only settle their differences with federative structures, but 
also set up structures to organise regional cooperation. Natural geographical 
regions such as the Caucasus and the Balkans (or the Baltic Sea, the Black 
Sea, etc.) always have a potentially useful agenda for cooperation over such 
matters as transport, energy and communications networks, policies for 
regional free trade and the movement of persons, environmental problems, 
combating cross-border crime, etc. The idea is that regional cooperation may 
generate common interests in peace rather than conflict. It is also observed, 
however, that the incentives for regional cooperation in chronically 
conflictual regions tend not to be perceived as strong enough to tip the 
balance decisively from war to peace.  
The supranational or external powers may overarch both these common state 
and regional cooperation arrangements, in order to ensure their survival in a 
post-conflict environment among the weak or failed states. Here the potential 
role of the EU has unique advantages. When the conflict states or entities 
have a long-term prospect of full EU membership, the democratic legitimacy 
of the overarching power has some serious foundations. The task for the EU 
is therefore to work on staged processes, in  which  former conflict zones 
graduate into EU associate status, then perhaps  to move on to accession-
candidate status in due course. 
Although the EU clearly now has the leading role for the Balkans and for 
Cyprus, the situation in Moldova and the Caucasus is seeing a strong Russian 
and American presence. Nevertheless, all these states have European 
aspirations and are Council of Europe members. They are candidates for 
progressive Europeanisation.  It remains to be seen  whether the troika of 
external powers or sub-set alliances (EU-Russia, Russia-US or EU-US), can 
coordinate effectively enough to secure durable solutions. One view is that 
the path towards this kind of solution will only come with or after the 
deepened Europeanisation of Russia itself. Such a view underlines why the 
dialogue between the EU and Russia on these unresolved conflicts, as 
already suggested above, is so relevant.  
The EU can, for the weak states and protectorates of the Wider Europe, 
provide a conveyor belt for helping these states or entities graduate out of the 
weak and protected category into full inclusion in modern (or indeed post-
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temporary arrangements (peacekeeping, support for the judiciary, border 
protection, etc.) that would otherwise risk categorisation as neo-colonialism, 
and therefore provoke opposition and resistance.  
Box 4. On protectorates, association, integration and annexation 
o  Protectorate. An external power keeps the peace with the aid of military 
or police forces as necessary and may also exercise powers of civil 
administration. The external power may be invited or uninvited, which 
means different degrees of democratic legitimacy.  
o  Association. A self-governing entity adopts some or even many of the 
policies and laws of an external power, usually its much bigger 
neighbour, but without becoming part of the political structure of the 
neighbour.  This regime derives its legitimacy from being voluntarily 
sought or accepted.  
o  Integration. The entity voluntarily becomes a full part of the economic 
and political structures and jurisdiction of the (formerly ‘external’) 
power. 
o  Annexation. This integration happens through the use or threat of force, 
or without the consent of the parties directly concerned or the 
legitimising agreement of the international community. 
Yet the process whereby the EU may become a more effective agent of 
conflict resolution in the European periphery is not without problems, even 
assuming the EU develops the political will and diplomatic capacity to do so. 
A current research project comparing four conflict cases suggests that there 
can be unexpected and perverse effects on the search for federative solutions 
to ethno-secessionist conflicts.
51  
The essence of the problem concerns how the incentive of Europeanisation 
and the conditionality of the EU may affect each of the conflict parties.
52 The 
EU has a strong, passive power of attraction to the states of its periphery, but 
this may not work in favour of resolving the typical ethno-secessionist 
conflict without this passive power being backed up by an effective and 
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complementary role as a foreign policy actor. The cases of Moldova and 
Georgia illustrate this situation vividly at the time of writing.
53  
The well-ordered small states and entities 
The purpose of this section is to separate the issue of the weak state from that 
of the numerous, well-ordered small or micro-European states and non-state 
entities. These small states and entities may be quite compliant with the EU 
criteria and acquis or could easily become so (Andorra for example). In the 
case of sovereign micro-states, their right to accede to the EU is written into 
the treaties as a matter of principle. Such states may want  to be almost 
completely integrated into the EU, but may be content not to be full members 
institutionally. In addition, there are non-state entities that cannot accede, 
because they are not states under international law. At some point the EU 
may introduce a minimum size criterion for new membership applications, 
such as population of 1 million, while still wishing to minimise exclusion 
effects. It may also  wish to provide an umbrella for some non-recognised 
entities whose status under international law is not settled or some sub-state 
entities that are semi-independent of member states. 
It would not be impossible to design a category of membership that could 
come close to full inclusion in the institutions of the EU alongside full (or 
almost full) jurisdiction of EU law and policies. Examples are set out in Box 
5. The EU has already given names to special categories such as ‘associated 
country’ or ‘associated territory’ and extracts from the existing treaties as 
adopted for the draft Constitutional Treaty are given in Annex D. The key 
constraint on inclusion in the EU’s institutional system is the 
intergovernmentalism of the Council of Ministers, where a very large 
number of small states threaten gridlock. This concern would also apply to 
the other institutional arrangements where there has to be one representative 
per  member state, for example  in  the Commission (unless the  proposed 
Constitution changes this), in the Governing Council of the European Central 
Bank and among the judges of the Court of Justice. In most other respects, 
there could be room for at least partial inclusion in the institutions for 
associated states, countries or territories. 
                                                 
53  In November 2003, Russia proposed a draft Constitution for a Federal 
Republic of Moldova to resolve the Transniestrian conflict.  This proposal, 
however, was considered biased in giving excessive power to Transniestria by 
both opposition parties in Moldova and the EU and US, and resulted in deep 
divisions at the OSCE foreign ministers’ meeting in Maastricht o n 1 –2 
December 2003. During the same month, Georgia plunged into a political crisis 
following  contested election results, leading to the resignation of President 
Eduard Schevardnadze and fresh elections planned for January 2004. The EU 
has not had a strong presence in either case.  THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 63 
Box  5. Possible mechanisms for partial participation in EU institutions by 
associated states and territories 
•  European Parliament.  An entity may participate through i nclusion in  the 
constituency of a neighbouring member state (for a micro-state/entity), or as an 
observer or full member (if population reaches avg. constituency size). 
•  European Commission. A commissioner will have relations with the associated 
states and entities in his/her portfolio of tasks. 
•  Council of Ministers. A member state chosen by the associated state or entity 
may be mandated to speak on its behalf. In the voting of the Council of 
Ministers under the double majority proposed by the Convention, the mandated 
member state may cast the population vote of the associated state or entity 
separately. A representative of the associated state or entity may attend as an 
observer within the delegation of the mandated member state in open legislative 
sessions. 
•  European Court of Justice. Full jurisdiction would apply. 
•  Economic and Social Committee. An entity may be an  observer (for micro-
state/entity) or a full member (where the population reaches average European 
Parliament constituency size). 
•  Committee of the Regions. Participation on this committee would be the same as 
for the Economic and Social Committee above. 
•  European Investment Bank. Full eligibility for project financing could be 
granted. 
•  European Central Bank. An entity could become fully part of the euro area (but 
with no seat on the Governing Council of the European Central Bank) with the 
possibility for the limited minting of euro coins (e.g. Monaco euro). 
•  Citizenship. Citizens would have full rights as those in member states; passports 
may bear the identification ‘European Union’, followed by the name and symbol 
of the entity, and possibly a triple identity where the entity has a special 
relationship in or with a member state.* 
•  Agencies of the EU.** Participation may be granted if useful. 
•  Staffing in the EU institutions. Eligibility for staff appointments would be on the 
basis of merit. 
 
*For example, citizens of the Åland Islands carry passports on which the cover page 
indicates the triple identification of the EU, Finland and Åland. 
**For example, agencies of the EU include: 
-  European Environment Agency 
-  European Training Foundation 
-  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug-Addiction 
-  European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
-  Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
-  Agency for Safety and Health at Work 64 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
One could extend this logic to the not yet well-ordered states or entities that 
seriously aspire to a European future and for  which the Europeanisation 
process needs to offer strong incentives. Such states or entities could be 
offered prospects for progressive inclusion in the institutions as well as the 
policies of the EU,  further  drawing on the list of options in Box  5.  But 
minimum standards of compliance with EU (and Council of Europe) norms 
would be required. Where an  associated  state,  country or  territory was 
vulnerable, weak or recuperating from a period of violent conflict, the 
security or governmental functions (or both) of the state could be supported 
by the EU. The minimum compliance with EU norms  could thus be 
implemented with the aid of the EU. An associated state could only apply for 
full EU membership if it no longer needed such support and was fully in 
control of its internal law and order. The category of associated territory may 
provide an ordered place within the EU for entities whose status under 
international law cannot (yet) be agreed by the interested parties (such as 
Kosovo or Northern Cyprus) or that choose to remain only semi-independent 
entities.  
Neighbourhood agreements 
In its Wider Europe document, the Commission sets out the idea of a new 
category of ‘Neighbourhood Agreements’ as the centrepiece of its proposals. 
The Convention on the Future of Europe suggested the use of more general 
language in the draft Constitution to address the same subject, proposing in 
Article 1 -56 (see Annex  D) that  “the Union shall develop a special 
relationship with neighbouring states”, and that “for this purpose the Union 
may conclude and implement specific agreements with the countries 
concerned”. The Commission also proposed that Action Plans be drawn up 
as preliminary activities to negotiating Neighbourhood Agreements.  
The Commission’s proposals were spoiled by obscure language about the 
precondition that existing agreements, such as the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with CIS states, be fully implemented. Since 
these agreements contain a very long list of policies over which the parties 
undertake to cooperate in unspecified ways, there is no way of knowing what 
the precondition means, and this uncertainty surely undermines the incentive 
effect or credibility of the initiative for the time being. In fact, the experience 
of the PCA agreements has not been hugely successful for at least two 
reasons that are not attributable to the partner states. First, as mentioned, the 
agreements are full of vague commitments that have no precise content or 
binding force. Second, the EU itself has evolved a lot since these agreements 
were first drafted almost a decade ago. In particular, the EU’s Justice and 
Home Affairs competences and its external and security policies have 
developed enormously, such that the agreements have become increasingly THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 65 
obsolete. Already there is discussion in diplomatic circles about what to do 
when the current PCAs reach the end of their initial periods of validity.  
Regarding the substance of future agreements, one approach would be to 
follow the draft Constitution and aim at a set of special relationships with 
each or any of the states or entities of the Wider Europe. The term 
‘Neighbourhood Agreement’ may turn out to be excessively restrictive. If in 
substance these agreements add to the family of association arrangements, 
this term ‘association’  may be more appropriate. It is potentially more 
flexible and could follow the  existing  precedents that include associated 
states, countries and territories. There is already a perceived interest in 
association, including the important case of Ukraine. It would also leave 
open the possibility of Association Agreements with non-state entities. The 
term would probably be acceptable to all partners, with the likely exception 
of Russia, which may prefer a ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’ to succeed 
its present PCA.  
A starting point and structure for such agreements  could be the list of 
common European policy spaces. For each space, how the partner state 
would relate to these European policy concepts would be set out,  and in 
some instances there will be a standard set of options as sketched above 
(section 3.3). There would be a primary focus on inclusion in these common 
policies. In addition, there would of course be the specific provisions tailored 
to the partner state. Here would be the place for the EU to deploy specific 
incentives, especially for the states or entities of the Wider Europe most in 
need of stabilisation and modernisation. 
4.2  The Greater Middle East  
We focus on two central issues:
54 
•  prospects for democratisation of the Greater Middle East and Western 
strategies to foster this; and 
•  issues of regional architecture and organisation.  
In both cases there is the issue of whether or how the EU and the US may 
work together.  
4.2.1  Objectives, principles and methods 
Fundamental changes are underway in the narratives about the political, 
economic and societal condition of the Greater Middle East – from Morocco 
to Afghanistan  and on to Central Asia.  These changes  concern  both the 
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nature and objectives of human development in relation to the currently 
authoritarian political regimes, and the role of Western policies in 
influencing political and economic strategies.  
Time has run out for the status quo in the Greater Middle East because of the 
extraordinary accumulation of crises in the region. Three of these are all too 
sharply identified – Israel-Palestine, al-Qaeda and Iraq. But the fourth one – 
the economic, political and societal crisis of the region – is quite different in 
nature. It is deep, diffuse and differentiated, yet with pervasive common 
features. It presumably links to the underlying cause of global terrorism, 
even if the definitive interpretation of al-Qaeda and associated movements 
remains to be written.  
The UNDP’s  Arab Human Development Report for  2002 is a recent, 
landmark document  written by Arab experts
55.  This report emphasises 
societal factors at work or the three key deficits that are considered defining 
features of the Arab socio-economic malaise: 1 )  the freedom deficit  (see 
Figure 3) where the Arab world is trailing behind even the poorest regions of 
the world; 2) the women’s empowerment deficit, with the lowest political and 
economic participation of women in the world; and 3) the human capabilities 
and knowledge deficit. About 65 million Arabs are illiterate, of which two-
thirds are women. The Arab world’s 1.2% penetration rate for personal 
computers and 0.6% for internet use is the lowest of all world regions. 
Conventional economic measures are also part of the story.
56 The overall 
incidence of absolute poverty is relatively low because of oil wealth, yet one 
in five people live on less than $2 per day. Economic growth per capita over 
the last two decades has been the lowest among all the world regions with 
the exception of sub-Saharan Africa. Integration with the world economy has 
not advanced in line with worldwide trends towards globalisation.  
Western policies were long based on the idea that regime stability was the 
priority, implying passive acceptance or active support for autocratic and 
often repressive regimes. Western policies have come in two variants, one 
essentially American and the other more European. The old US paradigm, 
starting after the Second World War, saw a basic deal with Saudi Arabia 
over the security of oil supplies for the West in exchange for strategic 
security guarantees for the regimes.  
 
                                                 
55 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002), op. cit. 
56 For an overview of economic performance see FEMISE Network (2002), 
Annual Report 2002 on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, FEMISE, 
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Figure 3. Average value of freedom scores, world regions,
1998-99
 
Source: UNDP (2002), Arab Human Development Report, UN, New York. 
The m ore recent European paradigm, as in its Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, has been to foster economic progress in the region as the leading 
agent of general development, which in due course would facilitate political 
progress in the direction of human rights and democracy.  Such progress 
would in turn favour Europe’s security interests, in terms of the abatement of 
pressures for migration (especially from North Africa) and access to energy 
supplies. 
Both of these paradigms of Western policy now have to be questioned. They 
are confronted with the objective facts that the Arab world has performed 
poorly under virtually all measures in the last decades,  in  absolute and 
relative terms compared with most other world regions. While these trends 
have been evident for a long time, it took the events of 11 September for the 
world to see that the region had become the breeding ground of al-Qaeda 
terrorism. The policies of securing stability as an overriding priority or of 
initially favouring economic development under authoritarian regimes – with 
minimal consideration to the political, social and human rights impact – has 
backfired.  
Evidence o f whether democracy favours economic growth has been a 
contested matter on both theoretical and empirical grounds. It is clear that 
democratic structures bring certain benefits, such as promoting the rule of 68 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
law, an open society and freedom of choice, as well as discouraging 
corruption. With few exceptions, developed states are also democratic. 
Although the empirical evidence has been unclear when based on cross-
country regressions, new evidence comes from  the  examination of the 
growth performance of a large sample of countries (40 in total) that made the 
move from authoritarian to semi-democratic or democratic regimes in the 
last two  decades.
57 The paradigm of the holistic development process  – 
political, economic and societal – is acquiring increasing support.  
Table 4. Attitudes towards religion, politics and democracy in 11 Muslim 
countries (in percentages) 
Country/Year  Religious 
person 
Politicians 
who don’t 
believe in 
God are unfit 
for public 
office 
(strongly 
agree or 
agree) 
Comfort 
and strength 
from 
religion 
God is very 
important 
(reported 10 
on 10 point 
scale)  
Democracy 
better than 
any other 
form of 
government 
(strongly 
agree or 
agree) 
Bangladesh/01   96.9  71  98.9  93.3  98.3 
Egypt/01  98.7  87.8  99.9  81.6  97.7 
Albania/98  94.9  NA  58.8  16.5  96.8 
Azerbaijan/96  88.3  NA  87.6  60.9  96.1 
Morocco/01   NA  90.1  99.8  99.2  95.4 
Jordan/01  86.2  81.3  99.7  98.5  90.3 
Bosnia/98  69.8  NA  64.7  30.3  89.4 
Turkey/01   78.4  57.3  91.1  76.7  88 
Indonesia/01   84.5  88.7  100  96.9  71.2 
Iran/01   94.9  NA  96.3  82.9  69.3 
Pakistan/97  NA  NA  84.6  74.2  NA 
Note: NA refers to ‘not available’. 
Source: World Values Survey, in al-Braizat, op. cit.  
Opinion surveys show a  strong discrepancy between the democratic 
aspirations of Muslim societies and the autocratic political regimes under 
which they live. Many scholars of the Middle East have overlooked this 
discrepancy, arguing that the problem of undemocratic regimes was a 
cultural one. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Table 4, there is no contradiction 
between the religiousness of Muslims and their interest and support for 
democracy. Overwhelming majorities are found to view democracy as better 
than any other form of government, alongside comparable majorities who 
                                                 
57 See F. al-Braizat (2003), The EU and Democracy Promotion in the Southern 
Mediterranean – Is it working?, CEPS Middle East Working Paper No. 5, CEPS, 
Brussels (forthcoming). THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 69 
consider themselves to be religious (for example 97.7% and 98.7% 
respectively in the case of Egypt, or 90% and 86% for Jordan). 
If it is to be accepted now that human development, sound governance and 
democratisation have to be part of a holistic development process, and that 
Islam in general has no inherent cultural incompatibility with these features 
of modernity, the issue becomes how to envisage a new era of profound 
reform of the region. The actual or recent strategies of the US and Europe 
towards the region encompass a huge range. These may be categorised as 
follows: 
•  Model 1. Acquiescence, where priority is given to regime stability, even 
when the regime is authoritarian and repressive. A blind eye is turned to 
objectionable regime features. It is now appreciated that such regimes 
have not only failed to deliver economic and social progress, but have de 
facto contributed to the environment that produced the new global 
terrorism. The conclusion has to be that time has run out for Model 1.  
•  Model 2 . Passive engagement,  where there is political dialogue over 
democratic values and human rights, but without significant incentive 
measures or pressures. Principal support for economic development is 
seen as a forerunner to democratisation. This model has been the EU’s 
approach under the Barcelona Process so far, which has some merits, but 
has not seen impressive results.  
•  Model 3 . Active engagement i s a more holistic approach, calling for 
political, economic and human development in parallel, strengthening 
the emphasis on democratic values and human rights, with more 
significant incentives. This may be the model for the period ahead, but 
so far it has not really been tested in the region.  
•  Model 4 . Aggressive engagement  takes action  against objectionable 
regimes. The  worldwide  track record  of sanction policies is poor, 
including the cases of Iraq, Iran and Libya, although not universally so, 
as in the overthrow of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The reverse 
logic of counterproductive effects, however, is well-known.  
•  Model 5 . Forceful regime change  may be  engineered by political 
pressures or by war in the extreme case. Bombing, invasion and military 
occupation are the models of Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. But the 
workings of this model for establishing sustainable democracy and 
modernisation remain uncertain and hazardous.  
In the post-11 September climate, US policy switched from Model 4 to 
Model 5 for Iraq. It continues to use Model 4 for Iran, but threatens to move 
to Model 5. The US has moved away from Model 1 as a general policy for 
the Arab world and is possibly heading towards Model 3 with its Middle East 70 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Partnership Initiative. Some voices in Washington seem to envisage a 
cascade of regime changes in the Middle East, following the application of 
Model 5 for Iraq, but others advocate a long-term process of democratic 
transformation, resembling Model 3.
58 US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz, at the heart of the neo-conservative element in the spectrum of 
opinions in the Bush administration, has argued (before the Iraq war) for a 
more precise scenario, with Iraq becoming the “first Arab democracy...[a] 
post-Saddam Iraq [that is] secular, middle class, urbanised, rich with oil that 
will replace the autocracy of Saudi Arabia as the key American ally in the 
Persian  Gulf, allowing the withdrawal of United States troops from the 
kingdom. The presence of a victorious American army in Iraq would then 
serve as a powerful boost to moderate elements in neighbouring Iran, 
hastening that critical country’s evolution away from the mullahs and 
towards a more moderate course.” This would be a demonstration case for 
the whole of the Middle East. 
Above the speeches of Mr Wolfowitz is the question  of  what President 
Bush’s agenda really is. Some Washington analysts, such as Ivo Daalder and 
James Lindsay, argue that while Mr Bush makes speeches that go along with 
the ideas of Wolfowitz and friends, whom they call ‘democratic 
imperialists’, his actions follow the different ideas of  Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld and Vice President  Richard  Cheney, whom they call ‘assertive 
nationalists’.
59 The latter group focuses on destroying direct security threats 
to the US and is reticent about taking on the agenda of state-building and 
societal transformation,  which they believe to be beyond the reach of 
external powers. Mr Daalder and Mr Lindsay conclude that President Bush 
“has occasionally used the rhetoric of democratic imperialists, notably in last 
week’s stirring speech before the National Endowment for Democracy.
60 But 
                                                 
58 See M. Ottaway et al. (2002), Democracy Mirage in the Middle East, Policy 
Brief No. 20, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 
October.  
59 See I. Daalder and J. Lindsay (2003), America Unbound: The Bush Revolution 
in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 
60  President Bush’s speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 
November 2003 includes the following passages: “More than half of all the 
Muslims in the world live in freedom under democratically constituted 
governments…Many Middle Eastern governments now understand that military 
dictatorship and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere...Sixty 
years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in 
the Middle East did nothing to make us safe…Therefore the United States has 
adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.” Bush 
recognised positive elements in Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen, Kuwait, 
Jordan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Finding no such signs in Egypt, the THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 71 
his longstanding disdain for nation-building, lacklustre interest  in  the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan and initial failure to push his subordinates to 
generate a plan for rebuilding Iraq all mark him as an assertive nationalist.”
61 
For the Middle East in general, excluding his ‘axis of evil’ cases of Iraq and 
Iran, Mr Bush says he is moving from Models 1 or 2 to Model 3. But this 
remains to be seen. 
EU policy in the  Barcelona Process has been  based  on Model 2. It had 
supported Model 4 for Iraq before the war, but Model 3 for Iran. When the 
US chose to move to Model 5 with war against Iraq, the EU was split down 
the middle and had no position. After the war in Iraq, the EU has hardened 
its position on WMD in general, which has obvious implications for Iran. 
This resolve led the EU to recalibrate its policy towards Iran, moving closer 
to Model 4. EU policy could now be recalibrated basically from Model 2 to 
Model 3 for the Greater Middle East as a whole and for the  Barcelona 
Process in p articular. The US could join it there, with their post-Iraq 
initiatives pointing this way (including the Middle East Partnership Initiative, 
free-trade proposals and strong support for the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap), 
but as just pointed out, Mr Bush’s intentions are subject to question. It is 
clear that in any case  the US has a huge task  to rebuild its image in the 
region, as shown by the data in Table 5. 
Table 5. Opinion of the United States in the Middle East, 2003 post-Iraq war 
(in percentages)  
  Very 
favourable 
Favourable  Unfavourable  Very 
unfavourable 
Israel  32  47  12  8 
Kuwait  30  33  16  16 
Morocco  13  14  13  53 
Lebanon  8  19  23  48 
Pakistan  3  10  10  71 
Turkey  2  13  15  68 
Jordan  -  1  16  83 
Palestinian 
Territory  -  -  13  85 
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project (2003), Views of a Changing World, June (retrieved 
from www.people-press.org). 
                                                                                                          
ultra-diplomatic President Bush suggested that “The great and proud nation of 
Egypt has shown the way towards peace in the Middle East, and now should 
show the way towards democracy in the Middle East” (retrieved from 
www.ned.org/event/anniversary/oct1603-Bush.html). 
61 See I. Daalder and J. Lindsay, “Bush’s priority in Iraq is not democracy”, 
Financial Times, 11 November 2003.  72 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
The US also has the task of rebuilding its reputation in Europe, as evidenced 
by a Eurbarometer poll of October 2003, which achieved instant notoriety for 
its results.
62 The survey asked how twenty countries were to be assessed as 
dangers to world peace. The first five places were occupied by Israel (59%), 
Iran (53%), North Korea (53%), the United States (53%) and Iraq (52%). 
China, India and Russia were ranked way down (30%, 22% and 21% 
respectively), while only 8% of this EU sample ranked the EU itself as a 
danger. The US and Israel thus found themselves ranked with the three 
members of Mr Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ in the eyes of European public opinion.   
This  view  leaves open two fundamental questions. The first concerns the 
conclusions to be drawn from the Iraq war, on issues of principle and 
practice. On the principles it has become clear that the original justification, 
to disarm weapons of mass destruction, was to a degree only a pretext. As 
the WMD argument evaporated, the justification reverted to the Wolfowitz 
argument made before the war, namely to achieve a regime change with such 
a demonstration of American power and such a positive response expected 
on the part of the Iraqi people that it would trigger a cascade of progressive 
developments throughout the region. This second argument, however, was 
then confronted by the post-war realities, in which the coalition forces were 
not regarded as liberators, but as unwelcome occupying powers. Although 
the provisional governing council set up in July has a carefully balanced 
structure for the early post-war period, the trends look ominous for the 
occupying powers, with casualties from guerrilla attacks virtually every day. 
It is possible that the war will result in perverse results, failing to bring 
liberal democracy to Iraq and instead  giving rise to  some combination of 
chaos, civil strife and Islamic-fundamentalist politics.  
The second issue is how to promote democracy and reform in the Greater 
Middle East by means other than regime-change-by-war. Considerable 
experience in the rapid transformation of political regimes has been acquired 
over the last decade in Europe  through the switch from communism to 
Western democracy. The Arab context has been set out in the UNDP Arab 
Human Development Report  as previously noted. To a degree, these are 
universal issues of human development, especially in a world of irreversible 
trends in global communications and integration. The agenda of interlocking 
issues is formidable: the formal institutions of governance; political 
pluralism and democratisation; the legal/judicial/penal system; human rights 
and their protection; civil society; the educational system; cultural identity; 
the tolerance of minorities and the harmony of cultures.  
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rebuilding of Iraq and peace in the world, Flash Eurobarometer No. 151, Taylor 
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A key point is the overriding political message to be communicated by the 
EU,  the  US and development agencies (bilateral and multilateral) to the 
states of the Middle East. As already argued, the message should be that the 
time  is over  for turning a blind eye  to  authoritarian regimes that fail to 
respect human rights. The earlier argument, to the effect that such regimes 
were to be given the benefit of the doubt because they brought geo-political 
stability, has run out of plausibility. The counter-argument is that the policies 
of exclusion, or the denial of political pluralism, have been inefficient at 
delivering economic, social and political progress to the  peoples of the 
region, and they have generated the support for the terrorist activities of 
Islamic fundamentalists.  
The EU and the US have the opportunity to coordinate their policies in this 
context. The EU’s Barcelona Process and relations with the GCC and Iran 
could all be given a stronger thrust on the  issues of governance, 
democratisation and human rights. The new US-Middle East Partnership 
Initiative, if endowed with sufficient budgetary resources to be significant, 
could be highly complementary.
63 
Beyond the primary political messages are a chain of implementation issues 
for the external parties. These issues are: a) the definition expectations and 
understandings about the nature and pace of political and institutional 
reforms; b ) the design of development  assistance across the range of 
parliamentary, judicial, governmental, educational and civil society 
institutions and the underlying cultures; c) the design of incentive measures 
and conditionality policies for all other aid programmes; and d) the issues of 
coordination between the EU, the US and international organisations.  
The question of performance measures will require a major effort. The EU’s 
experience with democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region, as 
reviewed in some detail by R ichard Youngs,
64 points to the need for 
improving the sophistication and professionalism of the methods of injecting 
external assistance, including support for progressive and indigenous civil 
society initiatives.  This  process  involves the issues of conditionality and 
incentives,  which must, however, be carefully calibrated so as to avoid 
undesirable distortions in the system, such as aid only going to partners who 
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Colin Powell in December 2002, with the intention of supporting a wide range of 
educational, governance and private sector developments. The initial budget of 
$20 million – which can only support pilot schemes – is to be increased to $145 
million next year.  
64 See  R. Youngs (2002), The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-
Muslim World, CEPS Middle East Working Paper No. 2, CEPS, Brussels, 
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‘speak Western’. There is little encouragement from experience for the use of 
crude sanctions as an instrument of political reform. A gradual intensification 
of arguments in political dialogue and a finer focusing of aid efforts on key 
parts of the transformation process should be the next step. There has to be 
time and sustained activity for the external party to build up pressure on the 
authorities and provide encouragement for progressive domestic movements.  
All the EU’s  Association Agreements (with  the  Mediterranean  states  and 
others) include an Article 2 that makes respect for human rights an essential 
part of the  relationship, including the possibility for either party to take 
appropriate measures in the event of disregard for these commitments. The 
official text launching the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in Barcelona in 
1995 defines these responsibilities, stating that the partner states must 
“respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective 
legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of 
expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other 
members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, 
nationality, language, religion or sex”.  
A recent report by Amnesty International,
65 submitted to the Valencia 
meeting of the Barcelona Process in April 2002, reviewed the current human 
rights record of the partner states of the region, and deplored the conclusion 
that the spirit of the Barcelona declaration is not being effected. Almost all 
partner states are the subject of critical reports. The criticism is extended 
further  to the EU with the words “the value of the human rights clauses 
contained  [in] common Article 2 in all agreements is nearing zero”. It is 
argued that assessments of compliance with Article 2 should be a set agenda 
item in all political dialogue meetings  between the parties, including the 
bilateral Association Councils, and that more adequate monitoring 
mechanisms should be established. 
The time to take these provisions more seriously has indeed come. At the 
level of formal political relations  between the EU and the Mediterranean 
states, the agreements and mechanisms of the  Barcelona Process initiated 
since 1995 are only now coming into legal effect, following the conclusion 
of negotiations and ratification of the bilateral Association Agreements. 
Although this process is still far from complete, a critical mass of operational 
agreements now exists. The opportunity now arises to move on to a more 
intense and explicit phase of political dialogue over human rights issues, as 
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well as a more comprehensive focus on human rights in all aspects of 
bilateral and multilateral relations. Moreover, the link between the treatment 
of human rights at the micro-level of individual rights and the objective of 
progressive democratisation is exceedingly important. There are many ways 
of designing democratic institutions, and respect for well-identified and 
codified human rights is a major results criterion for assessing any given 
system. It may be more legitimate and feasible for the external party to shift 
the  focus towards individual cases and away from the precise shape of a 
recommended institutional reform. 
4.2.2  Partnership and region-building 
How could the system as a whole shape up? What, if any activity, should 
there be with the Greater Middle East region as a whole? How should the 
Barcelona Process relate to a possible renewal of the Madrid multilateral 
process? How much of the accent should be placed on sub-regional groups? 
Should the  Barcelona Process, with Israel becoming the only non-Arab 
participant on the southern side, remain as it is? Or should there be a revival 
of the Euro-Arab dialogue instead? How much regionalism is called for at 
all, as opposed to the bilateralism that has been the main mark of US policy? 
The long list of regional groupings described in Box  6  shows that the 
answers to these questions are not self-evident. 
Conference of the Mediterranean and Middle East. Supposing that at least a 
stabilisation of the situation in Iraq occurs and there is progress in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, the opening of a new chapter in the history of the 
region could be initiated with a summit-level political conference, bringing 
together three sub-regional groups (the Maghreb, the Mashreq and the 
Persian Gulf), as well as the Quartet principals and associates on the Western 
side, along with the relevant international organisations. The private sector 
has already been active in this sense, for example the conference of the 
World Economic Forum in Jordan in June 2003 was attended by Western 
leaders. An official conference may be somewhat analogous to the Madrid 
Peace Conference of 1991 or the Balkan Stability Pact Conference of July 
1999 at the end of the Kosovo war. Unlike these earlier examples, however, 
there would not be a new, comprehensive structure of working groups 
subordinated to the conference, in view of the importance of other sub-
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Box 6. Arab and Islamic initiatives 
The Arab League was created  in 1945, with Cairo as its headquarters. Its 
membership has expanded from seven members at the beginning to 22. Its aim is 
to foster cooperation between member states and it arbitrates in the event of 
conflicts. In early years it sought to develop the ideological framework of Pan-
Arabism. Although an important political forum, the Arab League has not been 
able to become a motor or mechanism of integration. Among recent positive 
achievements, it did succeed in 2002 in multilateralising Arab support for the 
Saudi peace plan for the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The Euro-Arab Dialogue 
(bringing together the EU and the Arab League) was initiated in 1974, but 
political tensions in the region have prevented it from becoming an effective 
process. From an EU perspective, a re-activated Euro-Arab dialogue would now 
compete and overlap as a forum with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(Barcelona Process, which includes Israel).  
The Council for Arab Economic Unity  was established in 1957 under the 
auspices of the Arab League, leading in 1964 to the decision to establish the 
Arab Common Market. This initiative was limited, however, to Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria and (later) Libya, but became blocked with the Gulf war. Since 
1980, there has been a wide-ranging programme entitled Joint Arab Economic 
Action (JAEA), subordinated to the Economic and Social Council of the Arab 
League. This programme has led to a huge number of specialised working 
groups and joint venture projects. A fresh initiative was launched in 1998, with a 
project for an Arab Free Trade Area (AFTA), signed by 18 Arab states, with 
commitment to eliminate import tariffs in 2008, but this appears to be behind 
schedule. Its secretariat is in the Arab League’s economics department. Sub-
regional initiatives have been tried also, partly responding to the failure of pan-
Arab initiatives. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was founded in 1981 
with six member states (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman and Qatar, with Yemen recently joining some GCC Councils). The initial 
motivation was the perceived common threat coming from the fall of the Shah’s 
regime in Iran. The GCC established institutionalised cooperation with the EU in 
1988. The EU offered to negotiate a free-trade agreement on condition that the 
GCC made a Customs Union. In December 2001, a GCC summit decided to 
bring a customs union into force on 1 January 2003, which has now been 
confirmed in practice, instead of the earlier plan for 2005. As a result the Joint 
Council of EU and GCC of February 2002 noted that all the conditions for rapid 
progress in free trade negotiations were now present, the EU having decided a 
negotiating mandate in July 2001. The GCC decided in 2002 to establish a GCC 
Defence Council. The EU Commission decided to open a Delegation in Riyadh 
in 2002, responsible for all six GCC states. THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 77 
The Arab Maghreb Union was initiated in 1989 by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and  Tunisia with the Treaty of Marrakech, which provided an 
institutional structure. The decision was taken in principle, at summit level, to 
establish a free trade area by 1992 and a common market by 1995, but no 
implementing decisions followed; in 1995 Morocco called for a suspension of 
the Union because of its dispute with Algeria over territory in the Sahara. The 
EU has tried to support the Arab Maghreb Union, for example by agreeing to 
‘cumulation’ between states of the Arab Maghreb Union under the rules of origin 
for free trade with the EU, but this has remained theoretical. Morocco and 
Tunisia have effectively defected from the Union in favour of the Agadir Group. 
The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC or Mashreq) was founded also in 1989 
but has hardly existed at all, since its two most important members – Egypt and 
Iraq – soon found themselves on opposing sides of the Gulf war. In principle, the 
ACC would have included also Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the PLO.  
Since 2001, the  Agadir Group, consisting of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia, has sought faster progress in trade liberalisation (a free-trade area by 
2006), with a view to other initiatives as a ‘pioneer group’. The free-trade 
objective may be achieved early, in 2005.  
The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was founded in 1970 and 
currently consists of 55 member states. Its secretariat is located in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia. It meets at foreign minister level once a year and summit level every 
three years. The EU began a dialogue with the OIC at Helsinki in December 
1999, followed by a meeting of 30 foreign ministers of the EU and IOC in 
Istanbul in February 2002. This meeting focused on the objective of inter-
civilisational harmony and conflict resolution.  
The aim of such a conference would be to create a common sense of purpose 
for the long-term transformation of the region as a whole, as a cooperative 
endeavour  between the countries of the region and the main external 
interested parties. The initial political declaration would define objectives 
and underline the comprehensive approach envisaged (political, human, 
economic and security) and the promotion of regional cooperation and 
ultimately integration. It would advocate flexible, variable geometry in the 
mechanisms of cooperation at several levels (sub-regional groupings, 
bilateral actions, ad hoc groupings and linkages to wider organisations  – 
including the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Countries and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). The conference of the Mediterranean and 
Middle East region would gather only occasionally. A steering group could 
meet more frequently, based  on  what is  known as  the Quartet ( the  EU, 
Russia,  the  UN and the US) and the Arab Follow-up Committee (Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt and Jordan). It could include Israel as soon as political 
circumstances permitted.  78 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Sub-regional groups. The conference would recognise and encourage 
important tiers of activity at the following sub-regional levels: 
•  The Mediterranean states (of the Barcelona Process), including 
-  the Maghreb, which would anticipate a revival of the Arab-Maghreb 
Union at some stage, with its five members  –  Morocco, Algeria, 
Mauritania, Tunisia, and Libya; and 
-  the  Mashreq, which would embrace Israel, Palestine, Egypt, 
Lebanon and Syria, possibly with Iraq to associate with or join the 
group. The Mashreq would have the tasks of conventional regional 
cooperation to organise alongside the resolution of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict, but the level of political ambition would be greatly 
increased if confederation became the long-term objective. 
•  The Gulf Cooperation Council, which is developing progressively and to 
which Yemen would associate increasingly. 
The Mashreq case could be singled out for special encouragement to aim at 
more ambitious integration objectives in due course – possibly in the form of 
a Masheq  confederation  –  as trust was rebuilt in the conflict resolution 
process. This  group  would be based on the natural logic of cross-border 
economic cooperation in such a small and complex area, and the special 
problem of providing an adequate legal basis of the citizenship, the rights of 
movement, residence and employment for the substantial Palestinian refugee 
diaspora.
66 
Nevertheless t he experience in the conflict zones of the  south-eastern 
periphery of Europe (the  Balkans, Cyprus and the  Caucasus) is that local 
regional integration in post-conflict situations may not be seen as offering 
sufficient advantages to overcome the legacy of former or ongoing conflicts. 
Therefore, such integration  has to be supported externally (in the Balkans 
and Cyprus it is supported by the incentive of integration with Europe itself). 
The EU would promote regional and sub-regional cooperation in the Greater 
Middle East as part of its Wider Europe and neighbourhood initiative. 
The EU should therefore not only advocate a new Mashreq initiative 
(possibly resulting in a confederation to follow a peace between Israel and its 
neighbours), but also propose a new framework for the deeper integration 
between this Mashreq confederation and the EU itself. This initiative could 
consist of creating a  Euro-Mashreq  community, whose status and policy 
content would be more advanced than the present Association Agreements, 
although falling short of  prospects  for EU accession. It would provide 
                                                 
66 See  B.  Møeller (2002),  A Cooperative Structure for Israeli-Palestinian 
Relations – The Contours of a Post-Conflict Peace Order, CEPS Middle East 
Working Paper No. 1, CEPS, Brussels, November. THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 79 
especially strong support for the nascent institutions and policies of the 
Mashreq Confederation.  This  case  would b e the most urgent, but an 
analogous  Euro-Maghreb c ommunity and  Euro-Gulf c ommunity could 
follow in the same manner in due course. 
This offer of deepened cooperation would be based on three conditions: that 
the states in question were at peace with each other, that they were making 
serious commitments towards democratisation and respect for human rights, 
and that they were willing to  make progress with their own regional 
integrative organisations. These initiatives could begin with ‘advance guards’ 
of some but maybe not all of the states of the sub-region, acquiring further 
members in due course. The policy content of the proposed Euro-Mashreq 
community model is suggested by the deepening and widening of the EU’s 
Association Agreements in other areas, such as the Balkans. The institutional 
arrangements could derive some inspiration from the European Economic 
Area, which has its own surveillance and implementation authority, a court 
for dispute settlement, as well as joint committees of senior officials and 
ministerial councils.
67 New institutional developments could be placed in the 
region rather than in Brussels (for example, in Malta, which has the most 
central Mediterranean location).  
In general terms the EU would be adapting but not dissolving the Barcelona 
Process by: a) focusing more on the Maghreb and the Mashreq sub-regions 
separately; b ) emphasising more strongly the political and human rights 
criteria of progress;  c) offering better market access,  plus  expanding and 
improved aid; and d) wider association possibilities with the entire range of 
EU policies. The proposed Euro-Mashreq community (or Euro-Maghreb, or 
indeed Euro-Gulf equivalents) would not comprise any prospects for full EU 
membership as offered to the Balkans, but could offer open-ended 
opportunities for mutual integration short of full membership of the EU 
institutions. Israel, post-conflict and together with progressive 
transformation, would be in the most favourable position to profit from these 
possibilities because of its advanced economy. It could, for example, accede 
to the European Economic Area and later become a ‘virtual’ member of the 
EU through deep and wide association arrangements.  
The new US Middle East Partnership Initiative, from Morocco to the Persian 
Gulf, is not conceived as a multilateral structure. It would, however, fit in 
perfectly with a Mediterranean and Middle East initiative of the  kind 
described here. The US would coordinate bilaterally with the EU on many 
issues, both political and technical. It would be desirable for the EU, given 
its considerable experience of regional transformations, to have a dialogue 
with the US on these questions. Nevertheless, if there were to be a renewal of 
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the Madrid process following serious progress with the Roadmap initiative, it 
is unlikely that it would be in exactly in the form as the Madrid multilateral 
process for three reasons. First, the EU’s Barcelona Process has developed 
too substantially to be sunk into a new, single multilateral process. Second, 
there should be a priority for a more territorially focused Mashreq, given the 
need for this sub-region to  deal with local economic issues as well as the 
refugee question, and possibly even to develop into a confederation in due 
course. Third, some aspects of the broader political dialogue of the old 
Madrid process would be taken up afresh in the Mediterranean and Middle 
East conference. 
These last few pages have explored possible policy developments under the 
assumption of a peace between Israel and Palestine. But surely we must not 
conclude before assessing what the chances and content of a peace could be, 
and if slim, how EU policy towards the Mediterranean should develop. 
Under the Sharon government the prospects for peace have receded beyond 
the horizon. The discourse and realities of ‘war against terror’ have 
apparently suited  Mr  Sharon well. The discourse of ‘no negotiation with 
terror’ has reinforced the preference of Mr Sharon to avoid or defer as long 
as possible any negotiations on the fundamentals, namely the map of the 
future Palestinian state, the future of the refugees and the status of the holy 
places of Jerusalem. In fact, the only  progress on the map has been the 
construction of the fences around parts of the West Bank, leading to further 
expropriation of Palestinian land and the building of a de facto frontier, 
combined with the propaganda that this is not a political frontier but just a 
security measure. Meanwhile the Roadmap initiative, designed to induce a 
cessation of violence before final status negotiations, has fallen into disarray 
and irrelevance. 
The alternative peace strategy, arguably the only one with any real chance of 
success, has been freshly presented in the Geneva Accord of 1 December 
2003, negotiated  between non-official personalities of Israel and Palestine 
and signed by 300 members of the Israeli and Palestinian elite.
68 The Geneva 
Accord finishes off what the Clinton–Barak negotiations left undone, notably 
at Taba in January 2001.  
The map of the Geneva Accord follows the only logic that has international 
legitimacy and political plausibility: the pre-1967 green line, adjusted with 
land swaps on a  one-for-one compensation basis. The refugees would be 
given a large range of options with the exception that the right of return to 
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Israel would be severely c urtailed to what Israel itself would decide. The 
holy places would be divided along Clintonian lines. There would be an 
international peacekeeping force. 
The fundamental issue of political logic here is over the sequencing of the 
cessation of violence in relation to negotiations on the substance. The logic 
of the Geneva Accord is that a just outcome to the negotiations on the 
substance has to be visible and credible before extremist violence is likely to 
evaporate. The history of British and French decolonisation in the 1950s and 
1960s illustrated this logic, which was still visible in the example of the way 
to peace in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. If the pre-condition of peace is the 
cessation of violence, peace will never come. The logic of ‘no negotiation 
under the threat of violence’ may be emotionally appealing, but history and 
political analysis suggests that it tends not to work. Remarkably, even former 
leaders of the Israeli secret service organisation, Shin Bet, now seem to be 
coming to the same conclusion.
69 The Sharon government in the meantime 
complains about anti-Semitism in response to the European opinion survey 
results reported above, to the effect that Israel is a danger to world peace. 
More simply, European public opinion seems to judge that something like 
the Geneva Accord could be a sound peace plan, whereas  Mr  Sharon’s 
strategy seems not to be a peace plan of any kind. Mr Sharon has dismissed 
the Geneva Accord as irrelevant.  
Meanwhile the EU must proceed with its Wider Europe policy for the time 
being without a peace. The current idea of the EU is to offer to work out 
Action Plans within the context of Wider Europe policy with Morocco, 
Tunisia and Jordan bilaterally. New policies for Maghreb and Mashrek sub-
regionalism have to wait. 
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Chapter 5 
The Final Frontiers of Europe? 
here will the final frontiers of Europe be? So goes the familiar 
question, as the EU expands to 25 member states and begins to 
look seriously at the admission of Turkey.  
There are several competing answers to this very reasonable question.  
First is the reply of  the geographer, which coincides with the Council of 
Europe’s membership map to the south. But to the east the geographer and 
politician are in deep disagreement. Turkey and Russia are in Asia as well as 
Europe.  Therefore  the  second answer is the  geo-political compromise, 
wherein  Europe consists of states that are at least partly European  in the 
geographical sense, which also corresponds to the Council of Europe map. 
But this too lacks depth as an answer to questions that imply matters of 
identity, culture and values. 
The third answer tries to be more politically relevant and looks to the future, 
final frontiers of the European Union. The fourth answer is about the future 
extent of Europeanisation. These two are the interesting answers to look at 
more closely. The frontiers of the European Union are an institutional matter. 
The extent of the Europeanisation process is a societal matter. The two are 
moving in constant interaction.  
At the beginning of the 21
st century we observe that the European Union, for 
all its weaknesses, has a power of attraction to its outside neighbours. The 
EU as a political institution has committed itself to accepting all the states of 
the geo-political Europe that show they have become sufficiently 
Europeanised. The EU also defines its strategic security interests as starting 
with the Europeanisation of its neighbourhood.  
Nevertheless, the EU also has to constrain its enlargement by considerations 
of  the  workability of  its institutions. T he United States functions as a 
federation with some 50 states and virtually no intergovernmentalism. The 
EU will now try to pause for breath to introduce the proposed Constitutional 
Treaty and test its functionality for 25 (and soon after 27) member states. Yet 
the whole of geo-political Europe, with the exception of Russia, now 
officially express (at least long-term) aspirations for full membership. The 
inclusion of Turkey, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Norway, 
Iceland, Ukraine, Moldova, Switzerland, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
would make 41 members. The EU took almost half a century, from 1958 to 
2004, to go from  six to 25 members. A provisional reply to the original 
question, with the merits of simplicity and clarity, could indeed be to say that 
the EU will continue to expand towards 41 members  between  2004 and 
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2050. This is a serious timescale, both for the maturing of the EU’s own 
system of multi-tier governance to accommodate so many states, and for the 
post-communist transition in the still weak or failed states of the European 
periphery.  
Whether or not to join the EU is a realistic question for non-members to 
focus upon today, because the EU is the only credible European structure. 
But it is unrealistic to follow a too simple and binary logic – in or out of the 
EU. The EU’s frontiers  are  becoming fuzzier,  both within  Europe  and 
outside it. The concentric circle or cobweb models seem to have plenty of 
life in them these days. Within the EU, the newly acceding states want to be 
in everything and are not attracted to the euro-sceptic  or opt-out clubs. A 
core EU, however, is also in the making, alongside the EU’s formal rules that 
dictate the openness of all EU policies to all member states as a matter of 
political principle. The making  of  a  core Europe is seen in the further 
qualitative, post-accession admission criteria for the eurozone, the Schengen 
area and now the military dimension being prepared by France, Germany and 
the UK. In France and Germany, ideas about a bilateral union circulate, 
being viewed as an insurance against the possibility of the EU25 becoming 
unworkable. Outside the EU there are further rings of the cobweb, starting 
with the EEA system for Norway et al., moving towards the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements for the Balkans and on to the Wider Europe, which 
for the Commission, would extend to North Africa.  Therefore the more 
refined answer is that, while the EU’s formal membership will further 
enlarge over the first half of the 21
st century, at the same time there will be 
developments of the cobweb and concentric circles that change the meaning 
of being in or out of the EU.  
At this point the geo-political answer, that of the Council of Europe’s 
membership map as the final frontier, has to be reconsidered. Could parts of 
North Africa and the East Mediterranean become part of Europe? If Turkey 
can join the EU, why not Morocco or Israel? If Europe is about identity and 
values combined with physical proximity, which ignores strict geography as 
it has already done o n a huge scale with Russia and Turkey, the answer 
would possibly be yes. The Council of Europe itself is open to a wide range 
of association arrangements. As a not too-implausible example, it may take 
the  lead in exploring  how Morocco how  could progressively accede to 
Council of Europe conventions and protocols. 
This answer, however, is not really satisfying because it is hiding behind 
institutional formalism, which is not a reliable guide to the essence of the 
ideas that people have in mind. These ideas are surely more about values and 
identity. The Europeanisation idea represents dynamic processes over time, 
whereby these perceptions of values and identity spread out from core 
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communist transition. The Wider Europe concept seems to be  aiming at 
making the Europeanisation process happen without foreseeable prospects of 
EU accession.  
But can this work? The answer today is unknown. The non-EU countries of 
Europe continue to regard EU membership as the only significant incentive 
for Europeanisation. The Wider Europe idea is too vague and unconvincing, 
at least so far. Could it become strategically effective or will it just remain in 
the domain of token diplomacy? The ideas explored above about a 
comprehensive set of common European policy spaces, combined with 
institutional innovations, are an attempt to sketch  out  how the idea could 
conceivably become strategically effective.  
Nevertheless, the Europeanisation process is working alongside the driving 
forces, norms and institutions of globalisation,  which increase in relative 
importance as one reaches the outer edges of the Wider Europe. The blurring 
overlap of Europeanisation and globalisation seems likely to become more 
pronounced in  these outer reaches of the Wider Europe. To our original 
question, this prompts a fifth answer – the laziest, simplest and perhaps the 
most plausible one  – that there will never be such a thing as the final 
frontiers of Europe. 
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Annex A 
States of the Wider Europe 
and the Greater Middle East 
    Population 
(millions) 
National 
income 
($ billions) 
Council of 
Europe  OSCE 
NATO 
(or EAPC 
/PfP) 
Visa 
needed 
for EU 
Wider Europe* 
  EU  450  8,500        
1  Austria  8  195  Yes  Yes  EAPC   - 
2  Belgium  10  245 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
3  Denmark  5  164 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
4  Finland  5  123 Yes  Yes  EAPC  - 
5  France  59  1,381 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
6  Germany  82  1,940 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
7  Greece  11  121 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
8  Ireland  4  88 Yes  Yes  EAPC  - 
9  Italy  58  1,123 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
10  Luxembourg  0.4  23 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
11  Netherlands  16  390 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
12  Portugal  10  109 Yes  Yes  Yes   - 
13  Spain  40  588 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
14  Sweden  9  226 Yes  Yes  EAPC  - 
15  UK  59  1,477 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
16  Cyprus  0.7  10 Yes  Yes  No  - 
16a  North. Cyprus  0.2  1 No  No  No  Yes 
17  Czech Rep.  10  54 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
18  Estonia  1  5 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
19  Hungary  10  49 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
20  Latvia  2  8 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
21  Lithuania  3  12 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
22  Malta  0.3  5 Yes  Yes  No  - 
23  Poland  39  163 Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
24  Slovakia  5  20 Yes  Yes  Yes   - 
25  Slovenia  2  19 Yes   Yes  Yes  - 
  EU candidates  96  219        
26  Bulgaria  8  13 Yes  Yes   Yes  No 
27  Romania  22  39 Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
28  Turkey  66  167 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  EEA/EFTA   12  433        
29  Iceland  0.3  6 Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
30  Norway  5  160 Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
31  Liechtenstein  0.03  1 Yes  Yes  No  No 
32  Switzerland  7  277 Yes  Yes  EAPC  No 
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  Other micro-
states  
          
33  Andorra  0.06  1 Yes  Yes  No  No 
34  Vatican  0.001  NA Observer  Yes  No  No 
35  Monaco  0.03  1 Pending  Yes  No  No 
36  San Marino  0.03  1 Yes  Yes  No  No 
  SAA states  24  43         
37  Croatia  4  20 Yes  Yes  EAPC  No 
38  Bosnia  4  5 Yes  Yes  Peacekpg.  Yes 
39  Serbia & Mont  11  10 Yes  Yes  EAPC**  Yes 
39a  Kosovo  2   -  -  Peacekpg.  Yes 
40  Albania  3  4 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
41  Macedonia  2  4 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
  CIS Europe  225  313        
42  Russia  145  253 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
43  Ukraine  49  35 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
44  Moldova  4  2 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
44a  Transniestria  0.7  NA No  No  No  Yes 
45  Belarus  10  13 No  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
46  Azerbaijan  8  5 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
47  Armenia  4  2 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
47a  N. Karabakh  0.2  NA No  No  No  Yes 
48  Georgia  5  3 Yes  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
48a  Abkhazia  0.3  NA No  No  No  Yes 
Greater Middle East 
  Mediterranean  174  255        
49  Algeria  31  51 No  No  Dialog.  Yes 
50  Morocco  29  34 No   No  Dialog.  Yes 
51  Tunisia  10  20 No  No  Dialog.   Yes 
52  Libya  5  40       Yes 
53  Egypt  64  200 No  No  Dialog.   Yes 
54  Jordan  5  9 No  No  Dialog.   Yes 
55  Lebanon  4  18 No  No  No  Yes 
56  Palestine  3  3 No  No  No  Yes 
57  Israel  6  106 No  No  Dialog.  No 
58  Syria  17  17 No  No  No  Yes 
  Persian Gulf  135  590        
59  Iraq  24  20 No  No  No  Yes 
60  Bahrain  1  9 No  No  No  Yes 
61  Kuwait  2  37 No  No  No  Yes 
62  Oman  2  17 No  No  No  Yes 
63  Qatar  1  12 No  No  No  Yes 
64  Saudi Arabia  21  181 No  No  No  Yes 
65  Un. Arab Em.  3  40 No  No  No  Yes 
66  Yemen  18  8 No  No  No  Yes 
67  Iran  65  109 No  No  No  Yes 90 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
  Central Asia/ 
Afghanistan 
83  41        
68  Kazakhstan  15  20 No  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
69  Kyrgyzstan  5  1 No  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
70  Tajikistan  6  1 No  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
71  Turkmenistan  5  5 No  Yes   EAPC  Yes 
72  Uzbekistan  25  14 No  Yes  EAPC  Yes 
73  Afghanistan  27  20 No  No  Peacekpg.  Yes 
              
  Wider Europe  810  9,508        
  Greater  
Middle East 
392  886        
  GRAND TOTAL  1,200  10,394        
74  Canada  30  900 No  Yes  Yes  No 
75  United States  286  10,019 No  Yes  Yes  No 
* Italics are used for non-recognised secessionist entities. Accession of Northern Cyprus to the EU 
is intended in principle by all parties, but at present the conditions for accession with the rest of 
Cyprus in May 2004 have not been met. 
** An EAPC is expected in Serbia in 2004. 
Note: NA refers to ‘not available’. 
Source: World Bank, for population and (gross) national income data for 2001, completed using 
various internet sources. 
  
| 91 
Annex B 
Aid commitments of the European Union 
1995–2002 
  Population 
(millions) 
EU commitments of 
aid, 1995-2002 
(€ millions) 
Aid per capita 
(€) 
SAA states  24  5,913  246 
Croatia  4  283  71 
Bosnia  4  1,860  465 
Serbia & Mont  11  1,414  128 
Kosovo  2  1,106  553 
Albania  3  804  268 
Macedonia  2  446  223 
       
CIS Europe  225  2,053  9 
Russia  145  1,079  7 
Ukraine  49  673  14 
Moldova  4  87  22 
Transniestria  0.7  0  0 
Belarus  10  27  3 
Azerbaijan  8  77  10 
Armenia  4  50  13 
N. Karabakh  0.2  0  0 
Georgia  5  60  12 
Abkhazia  0.3  0  0 
       
Mediterranean  174  4,031  23 
Algeria  31  304  10 
Morocco  29  1,049  36 
Tunisia  10  686  68 
Libya  5  0  0 
Egypt  64  777  12 
Jordan  5  381  76 
Lebanon  4  194  49 
Palestine  3  459  153 
Israel  6  0  0 
Syria  17  181  11 
       
Persian Gulf  135  0  0 
Iraq  24  0  0 
Bahrain  1  0  0 
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Oman  2  0  0 
Qatar  1  0  0 
Saudi Arabia  21  0  0 
Un. Arab Em.  3  0  0 
Yemen  18  0  0 
Iran  65  0  0 
       
Central Asia/ 
Afghanistan 
83  2342  4 
Kazakhstan  15  78  5 
Kyrgyzstan  5  43  9 
Tajikistan  6  4  1 
Turkmenistan  5  25  5 
Uzbekistan  25  82  3 
Afghanistan  27  307  11 
Source: European Commission.  
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No single country is 
able to tackle today's 
complex problems on 
its own 
As a union of 25 states with over 450 
million people producing a quarter of 
the world's Gross National Product 
(GNP), the European Union is 
inevitably a global player... it should 
be ready to share in the responsibility 
for global security and in building a 
better world. 
Annex C 
A Secure Europe in a Better World 
European Security Strategy 
Submitted by Javier Solana to the European Council  
in Brussels, 11–12 December 2003 
Introduction 
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of 
the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and 
stability unprecedented in European history. 
The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It 
has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. 
European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to 
co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive 
spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes 
change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive 
enlargements are making a reality o f the vision of a united and peaceful 
continent. 
The United States has played a critical role in 
European integration and European security, in 
particular through NATO. The end of the Cold 
War has left the United States in a dominant 
position as a military actor. However, no single 
country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own. 
Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in 
the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. 
Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed 
conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, 
and most of the victims have been civilians. 
As a union of 25 states with over 
450 million people producing a 
quarter of the world’s Gross 
National Product (GNP), and 
with a wide range of instruments 
at its disposal, the European 
Union is inevitably a global 
player. In the last decade 
European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as 
Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of 94 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
45 million people die every year of 
hunger and malnutrition... Aids 
contributes to the breakdown of 
societies... Security is a 
precondition of development 
European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU 
makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to 
share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world. 
I.  THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES 
AND KEY THREATS 
Global Challenges 
The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which 
the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of 
trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of 
democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others 
have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These 
developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a 
part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – 
and so vulnerability  – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, 
energy, information and other fields. 
Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them 
civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result 
of conflict. 
In much of the developing world, 
poverty and disease cause untold 
suffering and give rise to pressing 
security concerns. Almost 3 billion 
people, half the world’s population, 
live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 
million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the 
most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the 
breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global 
threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many 
cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict. 
Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys 
infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, 
deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A 
number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity 
and poverty. Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will 
be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create 
further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions. 
Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s 
largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 95 
The last use of WMD was by the 
Aum terrorist sect in the Tokyo 
underground in 1995, using 
sarin gas. 12 people were killed 
and several thousand injured. 
Two years earlier, Aum had 
sprayed anthrax spores on a 
Tokyo street. 
consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports 
come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa. 
Key Threats 
Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. 
Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and 
less predictable. 
Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to 
undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a 
growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist 
movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are 
willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. 
The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to 
violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include 
the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the 
alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is 
also a part of our own society. 
Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are 
targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been 
uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted 
European action is indispensable. 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest 
threat to our security. The international 
treaty regimes and export control 
arrangements have slowed the spread of 
WMD and delivery systems. We are 
now, however, entering a new and 
dangerous period that raises the 
possibility of a WMD arms race, 
especially in the Middle East. Advances 
in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in 
the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a 
serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element 
of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk. 
The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire 
weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to 
inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies. 
Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes 
Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and 
indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. 96 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten 
regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical 
infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human 
rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides 
opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand 
for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will 
sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict. 
State Failure:  Bad governance  – corruption, abuse of power, weak 
institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from 
within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State 
institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best 
known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious 
threats, such as organised crime or terrorism.  State failure is an alarming 
phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional 
instability. 
Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This 
internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-
border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts 
for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with 
terrorism. 
Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. 
Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in 
several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber 
and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities 
undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, 
organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe 
comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for 
private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks 
which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims 
of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will 
merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy. 
Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum 
violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, 
the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could 
be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.  
II.  STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than 
we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 97 
In an era of globalisation, distant 
threats may be as much a concern as 
those that are near at hand... The first 
line of defence will be often be abroad. 
The new threats are dynamic... 
Conflict prevention and threat 
prevention cannot start too early. 
to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its 
values, the EU has three strategic objectives: 
Addressing the Threats 
The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats. 
It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the 
adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and 
an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues 
to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences. 
It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has 
just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls 
and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is 
committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as 
well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions. 
The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with 
regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the 
Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle 
organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised 
crime within the EU. 
In an era of globalisation, distant 
threats may be as much a concern as 
those that are near at hand. Nuclear 
activities in North Korea, nuclear 
risks in South Asia, and 
proliferation in the Middle East are 
all of concern to Europe. 
Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities 
in central or south- east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their 
citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe 
of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world. 
Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and including the Cold War – 
was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of 
defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of 
proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever 
more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are 
neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be 
ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention 
cannot start too early. 98 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Enlargement should not 
create new dividing lines in 
Europe. Resolution of the 
Arab/Israeli conflict is a 
strategic priority for Europe 
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new 
threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. 
Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained 
through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other 
pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with 
terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and 
other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore 
order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts 
need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be 
needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve 
reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil 
government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to 
such multi-faceted situations. 
Building Security in our Neighbourhood 
Even in an era of globalisation, 
geography is still important. It is in the 
European interest that countries on our 
borders are well-governed. Neighbours 
who are engaged in violent conflict, 
weak states where organised crime 
flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its 
borders all pose problems for Europe. 
The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the 
EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed 
countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the 
Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. 
The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our 
concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international 
partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of 
major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the 
consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers 
both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform. 
It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in 
Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political 
cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems 
there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the 
problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a 
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Our security and prosperity 
increasingly depend on an 
effective multilateral system. We 
are committed to upholding and 
developing International Law. The 
fundamental framework for 
international relations is the 
United Nations Charter. 
Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. 
Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the 
Middle East.  The European Union must remain engaged and ready to 
commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - 
which Europe has long supported- is now widely accepted. Implementing it 
will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the 
United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, 
but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves. 
The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of 
economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European 
Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean 
partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation 
in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the 
Arab World should also be considered. 
An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism 
In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security 
and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The 
development of a stronger international society, well functioning 
international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. 
We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The 
fundamental framework for 
international relations is the United 
Nations Charter. The United Nations 
Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Strengthening the United Nations, 
equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities 
and to act effectively, is a European 
priority.  
We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in 
confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be 
ready to act when their rules are broken. 
Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have 
extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is 
negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen  the 
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One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic 
relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the 
international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of 
this relationship. 
Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European 
Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe 
has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, 
MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a 
more orderly world. 
It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in 
response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global 
warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such 
as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the 
International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates 
that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control 
regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to 
security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond. 
The quality of international society depends on the quality of the 
governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a 
world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, 
supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of 
power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best 
means of strengthening the international order. 
Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. 
As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading 
entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue 
these goals. 
Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, 
conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in 
our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice 
and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union 
and its citizens. 
A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of 
international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate 
international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the 
international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. 
Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be 
paid, including in their relationship with the European Union. 
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We need to develop a 
strategic culture that 
fosters early, rapid and 
when necessary, robust 
intervention. 
III.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE 
The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy 
and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be 
used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if 
we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more 
active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others. 
More active  in pursuing our strategic 
objectives. This applies to the full spectrum 
of instruments for crisis management and 
conflict prevention at our disposal, including 
political, diplomatic, military and civilian, 
trade and development activities. Active 
policies are needed to counter the new 
dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, 
rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. 
As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on 
defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We 
could add particular value by developing operations involving both military 
and civilian capabilities. 
The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to 
international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its 
cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to 
enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations. 
We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs 
of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. 
Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A 
European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active 
will be one which carries greater political weight. 
More Capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will 
take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway  – notably the 
establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction. 
To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable 
them to a ddress the new threats, more resources for defence and more 
effective use of resources are necessary. 
Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, 
overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities. 
In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by 
civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian 
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Acting together, the 
European Union and the 
United States can be a 
formidable force for good 
in the world. 
Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the 
resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with 
problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better 
understanding and communication. 
Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This 
requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with 
partners. 
As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of 
a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament 
operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security 
sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building. 
The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance 
the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the 
strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. 
This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new 
century.  
More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act 
together. Over recent years we have created a number of different 
instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. 
The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and 
capabilities: European  assistance programmes and the European 
Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States 
and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on 
that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. 
Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should 
follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of 
command. 
Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs 
policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime. 
Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also 
embracing the external activities of the individual member states. 
Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with 
conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without 
regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and 
West Africa shows. 
Working with partners  There are few if 
any problems we can deal with on our own. 
The threats described above are common THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 103 
threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a 
necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral 
cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key 
actors. 
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European 
Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. 
Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This 
is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and 
increase its coherence.  
We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor 
in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce 
progress towards a strategic partnership. 
Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the 
world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin 
America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. 
In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, 
China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and 
values, and are prepared to act in their support. 
Conclusion 
This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European 
Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with 
the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable 
European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it 
would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer 
and more united world.  
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Annex D 
Selected articles of the draft Constitution 
relating to membership of the European 
Union, its immediate environment, and 
associated countries and territories 
 
Article 1-56: The Union and its immediate environment 
1.  The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring states, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, 
founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and 
peaceful relations based on cooperation.  
2.  For this purpose, the Union may conclude and implement specific 
agreements with the countries concerned in accordance with Article [III-
222 (ex-Article 33)] of the Constitution. These agreements may contain 
reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking 
activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of periodic 
consultation.  
Article 1-57: Conditions and procedure for applying for Union 
membership 
1.  The Union shall be open to all the European states which respect the 
values referred to in Article I-2 of the Constitution, and are committed to 
promoting them together. 
2.  Any European State which wishes to become a member of the Union 
may address its application to the Council. The European Parliament and 
the  member states’ national parliaments shall be notified of this 
application. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the 
Commission and obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The 
conditions and arrangements for admission shall be subject to ratification 
by all the contracting States, in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements.  
Title IV: Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories 
Article III-181  
The non-European countries and territories which have special relations with 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom shall be THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 105 
associated with the Union. These countries and territories (hereinafter called 
the “countries and territories”) are listed in Annex II.
70 
The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic 
relations between them and the Union as a whole. 
Association shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the 
inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to  lead them to the 
economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire. 
Title VII: Common Provisions 
Article III-326  
Taking account of the structural economic and social situation of the French 
overseas departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands, which is 
compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography 
and climate, economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and 
combination of which severely restrain their development, the Council of 
Ministers, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt European 
regulations and decisions aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions 
of application of the Constitution to those regions, including common 
policies. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament. 
The measures referred to in the first paragraph concern in particular areas 
such as customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and 
fisheries policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential 
consumer goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural funds and 
to horizontal Union programmes. 
The Council of Ministers shall adopt the measures referred to in the  first 
paragraph taking into account the special characteristics and constraints of 
the outermost regions without undermining the integrity and the coherence of 
the Union legal order, including the internal market and common policies. 
Article IV-3: Scope 
1. The Treaty establishing the Constitution shall apply to the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the 
Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic 
                                                 
70 These consist of Greenland,  British, French and Dutch islands in the 
Caribbean, Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, and British and French Antarctic 
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of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (…). 
2. The Treaty establishing the Constitution shall apply to the French overseas 
departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands in accordance with 
Article III-326 of Part Three. 
3. The special arrangements for association set out in Title IV of the third 
Part of the Treaty establishing the Constitution shall apply to the overseas 
countries and territories listed in [Annex II to the TEC]. The Treaty 
establishing the Constitution shall not apply to overseas countries and 
territories having special relations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland which are not included in that list. 
4. The Treaty establishing the Constitution shall apply to the European 
territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible. 
5. The Treaty establishing the Constitution shall apply to the Åland Islands in 
accordance with the provisions set out in Protocol 2 to the Act concerning 
the conditions of accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden. 
6. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs: 
(a) the Treaty establishing the Constitution shall not apply to the Faeroe 
Islands; 
(b) the Treaty establishing the Constitution shall not apply to the sovereign 
base areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 
Cyprus; 
(c) the Treaty establishing the Constitution shall apply to the Channel Islands 
and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation 
of the arrangements for those islands set out in the Treaty concerning the 
accession of new Member States to the European Economic Community and 
to the European Atomic Energy Community, signed on 22 January 1972. 
Article IV-4: Regional unions 
The Treaty establishing the Constitution shall not preclude the existence or 
completion of regional unions  between Belgium and Luxembourg, or 
between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to the extent that the 
objectives of these regional unions are not attained by application of the said 
Treaty.  
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Annex E 
Joint Statement of the 12th EU-Russia 
Summit, Rome, 6 November 2003 
By S. Berlusconi, President of the European Council, assisted by J. Solana, 
Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, R. Prodi, President of the Commission of the 
European Communities and V.V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation. 
1. We, the leaders of the European Union and the Russian Federation, held 
intensive and productive discussions in Rome on 6 November  2003. We 
agreed to reinforce the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, on 
the basis of common values, with the aim of consolidating stability, security 
and prosperity on the European continent. We reaffirmed our shared vision 
of a united European continent. 
Integrating Europe – creating common spaces 
2. We reconfirmed our commitment to promote further rapprochement and 
gradual integration of social and economic structures of the enlarged 
European Union and Russia. In this regard, we agreed to intensify and focus 
our efforts to fulfil the decision to create common spaces between the EU 
and Russia, building on the PCA and the Joint Statement of the St. 
Petersburg Summit. In so doing, we expressed strong determination to 
produce concrete results. 
3. We agreed to step up our efforts  aimed at streamlining our political 
dialogue and launching the work of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership 
Council, which will make our coordination more efficient and transparent. 
4. We will continue our extensive discussions on the impact of EU 
enlargement and endeavour to make progress on outstanding issues aiming at 
their speedy resolution. We look forward to the timely extension of the PCA 
to the new EU Member States. 
The common European economic space  – building blocks for 
sustained economic growth 
5. We endorsed the work of the CEES High Level Group and welcomed the 
annexed concept of the common European economic space (Annex I). We 
agreed to continue this work, taking full account of the recommendations of 
the HLG report (Annex II), with a view to achieving tangible results as early 
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encouraged intensified dialogue in relevant fora with a view to presenting 
proposals on how to promote trade and investment. 
6. We undertook to ensure that EU enlargement brings the EU and Russia 
closer together i n a Europe without dividing lines. We reaffirmed our 
commitment to implement as soon as possible and in full the package on 
Kaliningrad agreed in November 2002, including the launch of a high-speed 
train feasibility study before the end of 2003 and its timely completion. We 
welcomed the entry into force of the Russian-Lithuanian Border Agreements. 
We noted with satisfaction the success of our coordination to facilitate the 
transit of Russian citizens. We welcomed positive developments in the field 
of customs coordination. We confirmed our readiness to intensify our result-
oriented work within the PCA framework on the appropriate modalities for 
the transit of goods. 
7. We welcomed the progress achieved so far on the negotiations on Russia's 
accession to the W TO and remain persuaded that it is both possible and 
desirable to work towards Russia's accession taking place towards the end of 
2004. We called on our negotiators to intensify their work and resolve the 
outstanding issues for conclusion of bilateral market access negotiations on 
Russia's WTO accession with this timeframe in mind, whilst ensuring 
mutually acceptable and commercially  viable terms. We agreed to  aim 
towards the early resolution of outstanding bilateral trade issues. 
8. We took note of the annexed fourth Progress Report on the Energy 
Dialogue (Annex III). We welcomed progress in the field of energy and 
agreed to enhance our coordination in this area.  
9. We noted the key role of integrated transport networks and of systems of 
satellite navigation in underpinning economic coordination. 
10. We recognised our responsibility to tackle together and in the framework 
of relevant international organisations, instruments and fora, common 
environmental challenges and shared concerns regarding climate change and 
transport safety. 
Towards the common space of freedom, security and justice 
11. We agreed to take forward work to create a common space of freedom, 
security and justice. 
12. We reaffirmed the importance of people-to-people contacts in promoting 
mutual understanding  between our citizens. We welcomed the recent 
meeting of our experts, which took place in the context of our agreement to 
examine conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term perspective and to look 
at existing flexibilities within the Schengen agreement, in order to facilitate 
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dialogue. We took note of the progress of our negotiations on an EU-Russia 
readmission agreement and agreed to continue to work towards its timely 
conclusion. 
13. We underlined our shared interest in intensifying coordination in the field 
of justice and home affairs. We instructed our experts to vigorously 
implement the Action Plan on Organised Crime. We welcomed the signature 
of the agreement between the Russian Federation and Europol. 
The common space of external security – partners in security, 
crisis management and international relations 
14. We confirmed a high degree of mutual understanding with regard to a 
number of acute international issues and the central role of the UN in world 
affairs. 
15. We condemned all acts of terror and stressed the importance of 
international  coordination to combat terrorism in all its forms. We are 
committed to intensified coordination on new security threats and challenges. 
Contacts are also foreseen to explore possible  coordination in the field of 
civil protection and long-haul air transport for crisis management. 
16. We agreed to strengthen our dialogue and coordination on political and 
security matters, thus contributing to the consolidation of peace and stability. 
We confirmed the importance of working together to address crisis situations 
and in support of ongoing efforts in agreed formats aimed at the resolution of 
frozen conflicts in Europe and beyond. 
17. To underline our willingness to cooperate in these areas, we adopted a 
joint declaration between the European Union and the Russian Federation on 
strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters 
(Annex IV). 
The common space of research and education, including cultural 
aspects – our common intellectual heritage and capital 
18. We welcomed the renewal of the Agreement on Science and Technology 
Coordination. We agreed to examine means to open up our science and 
technology programmes to EU and Russian researchers to the fullest extent 
possible on a reciprocal basis. 
19. We welcomed Russia’s accession to the Bologna process and agreed to 
promote intergovernmental collaboration in the education sector. We looked 
forward to Russian participation in the EU Erasmus Mundus  programme 
from 2004. 
20. We agreed to continue our discussions on various matters of interest for 
the EU and Russia. 110 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Extracts from the Concept Paper on the Common European 
Economic Space (CEES) 
[from Annex II to the Joint Statement] 
Definition 
12. The CEES means an open and integrated market between the EU and 
Russia, based on the implementation of common or compatible rules and 
regulations, including compatible administrative practices, as a basis for 
synergies and economies of scale associated with a higher degree of 
competition in bigger markets. It shall ultimately cover substantially all 
sectors of economy. 
Objectives 
13. For this vision to become reality, the CEES aims at: 
· Promoting trade and investment between the EU and Russia, based on well-
functioning market economies,  aiming at sustainable development, taking 
into account internationally recognised principles, such as, inter alia, non-
discrimination and transparency and good governance; 
· Creating opportunities for business operators through common, harmonised 
or compatible rules and regulations, as well as through inter-connected 
infrastructure networks; 
  Enhancing the competitiveness of the EU and Russian economies 
worldwide. 
Guiding principles 
14. The CEES w ill be based on existing and future commitments of the 
Parties in the PCA and WTO. Its scope shall be broader and deeper in 
comparison to the WTO and PCA provisions. Both Parties shall ensure that 
the CEES is compatible with existing or future commitments undertaken by 
the Parties in the context of WTO. 
15. The CEES concept covers both horizontal and sectoral targets. A number 
of areas for action have already been considered for action (standardisation, 
technical regulation and conformity assessment, customs, audit and 
accounting, public procurement, competition, financial services, 
telecommunications, cooperation in space launching, several branches of 
industry and agriculture), and other sectors/issues shall be added as 
appropriate. 
16. The CEES shall be created progressively and in stages with appropriate 
interim reviews.  While specific activities shall be undertaken in selected 
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possible, it shall be kept in mind that the CEES  aims  at covering 
substantially all sectors of economy. The Parties shall ensure the consistency 
of activities undertaken with the overall aims of the CEES as set out above, 
notably the development of a comprehensive framework for economic 
coordination. Experience gained in ongoing activities should be used, and 
synergies  between new initiatives and existing areas of  coordination be 
exploited wherever possible. 
17. Established coordination in specific sectors (i.e. Energy Dialogue) shall 
continue to be worked on under the respective separate procedures with a 
view to integrating their results into the CEES in due course. Both sides shall 
ensure that the development of the CEES concept and sector specific 
coordination will be coherent and compatible. 
Components and implementation instruments 
18. The CEES shall focus on eliminating obstacles and creating opportunities 
in four main areas of economic activity, i.e. 
-  Cross-border trade of goods, covering substantially all industrial and 
agricultural goods, including the necessary rules – whether set by standards, 
technical specifications or other regulatory and legal requirements,  – 
organisational structures and procedures; while ensuring that these do not 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade and promoting equivalent levels of the 
protection of safety, health and the environment. 
- Cross-border trade in services, including relevant regulatory standards and 
requirements; 
-  Establishment and operation of companies, including, inter alia, issues 
related to movement of capital, environmental standards and good corporate 
governance; 
- Related aspects of movement of persons, in the relevant fields of economic 
activity. 
19. The main instruments to be applied in these areas are market opening, 
regulatory convergence, and trade f acilitation. These instruments shall be 
used in accordance with the following: 
· Market opening: Appropriate measures shall ensure, when possible, the 
gradual removal of obstacles to trade and investment between the EU and 
Russia. The definition of specific objectives and measures in this area will be 
based on Russia’s and the EU’s commitments in WTO, as well as on WTO 
general principles. 
·  Regulatory convergence:  Coordination in this field, particularly with 
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promote trade and investment  between the EU and Russia. Regulatory 
convergence is an important condition for strengthening the bilateral 
economic links. This is particularly true for the case of standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessments, but should also cover other fields. 
· Trade facilitation: Measures in the field of trade facilitation will be another 
important element in the creation of CEES. These measures may refer to the 
simplification, standardisation and a utomation of trade procedures, in 
particular the import, export and transit requirements and procedures applied 
by customs and other agencies. 
20.  Cooperation and specific dialogues:  Both sides shall pursue and 
strengthen their coordination in upgrading and enhancement of infrastructure 
networks (transport, energy, telecommunications, cooperation in research 
and development). Increased cooperation in this field will have the double 
effect of, on the one hand, integrating important parts of the EU and Russian 
economies which will be beneficial to these sectors, and, on the other hand, 
contributing to the improvement and enhancement of the framework 
conditions for other business activities in other sectors. 
Discussions on enhancing the existing links in energy, transport and 
telecommunication networks are underway, and the necessary framework for 
the transport sector exists (i.e. pan- European transport corridors  etc.). 
Regarding the energy sector, key projects for gas and oil pipelines as well as 
interconnection of the electricity networks have been identified as ‘common 
interest’ projects under the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and work is 
continuing in that framework. Under the CEES, the EU and Russia should 
focus on the transport sector and give a new boost to progress in this area. 
Both sides have strong assets in the field of research and development and 
they have, as a matter of domestic economic policy, made research, 
innovation, and technology keystones for their competitiveness and long-
term development. A number of instruments are already used for cooperation 
in this domain,  aiming at promoting linkage, innovation and technology 
transfer  between Russian and European partners in pursuit of mutually 
beneficial scientific excellence. Work under the CEES should serve to 
further expand cooperation by way of pooling resources and reciprocal 
access to research and development  programmes, settling any intellectual 
property issues in this field, and promotion of the use of the results of such 
research. The development of activities under the CEES also needs to bear in 
mind that the EU-Russia Summit of St. Petersburg of May 2003 decided to 
create a common ‘space’ of research and education. 
21. In all of these areas, the Parties shall promote closer and more structured 
permanent relations between their respective institutions, whether public or 
private. The resulting better information exchange and closer cooperation are THE WIDER EUROPE MATRIX | 113 
prerequisites for achieving the stated goals and at the same time serve to 
avoid as much as possible any undesirable side-effects on either party of 
measures contemplated for broader reasons. Development of compatible 
institutional structures as well as creation of specific joint institutions may be 
anticipated in the framework of some commitments and agreements. The 
activity of such institutions should be aimed at the implementation of the 
achieved arrangements and decisions.  
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Annex F 
Serbia in Europe 
by Jelena Radovanovic
* 
Ever since I became aware of the world around me, you have broken my 
heart with bloody truths. I do not imagine you so brave, invincible and 
unbreakable. No, I see you as one who is alone, even among other people. I 
do not imagine you, standing at the eternal crossroads where the winds too 
collide, as remaining always yourself. No, you  are one who is accepted 
nowhere, always too east to be the West, too proud to be the East. You are 
one whose light is not understood, so they come brandishing your darkness. 
They say that freedom once sprang up from your graves; but I fear that only 
grass  sprouts from them today, rampant, succulent, green and clustering. 
Freedom has long since ceased to depend on us.  
I love you and hate you at the same time, as it often is with love. I love you 
for the doves you receive into your abundant treetops, for the spring evenings 
when I sense your fragrance, for the wide, swelling rivers along whose 
shores we rush like ants. I love you for the earth from which dew-sprinkled 
flowers rise, for the cool rain that rustles in the vineyards. I love how you 
paint watercolours in pink and aqua across the sky after a summer shower. 
At such times it seems I can hear the heartbeat deep within the warm earth. 
And it seems that all the happy and unhappy wanderers have finally found 
refuge in that steady pulse.  
Then the shadows of war come again, and again I hate you. You have bound 
me to you without giving me a choice. I speak your language and see things 
your way. Strangers’ eyes do not understand  me; they regard me as a 
criminal. I hate you for these boys who carry bombs and know every kind of 
rifle, for those mildewy cellars where children tremble. And most of all I 
hate you for these graves from which clusters of grass are sprouting. For no 
reason. I feel pity then, I see you bowed down in tears, your heart bleeding. 
Again, again they have betrayed you.  
Is there a heavier burden than history? I sometimes feel I don’t know 
whether this is a country or a great battlefield whose good and evil have 
become used to waging their endless conflict. Your earth has been turned up 
more by the hooves of foaming horses than by ploughs. You have heard the 
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rattling of the nobles’ sabres more often than the song of peace. They praised 
you and cut you down at the same time. Death flowed on your waters. They 
blinded you, so that you could not see what was just. Whose hand was it that 
dared, so long ago, to s ow discord among your beauties? Whose hand 
bestowed on you such fertility for evil? Even as the hatchets are buried here, 
new hatreds are arising from them. History teaches us that hatchets should 
never be buried here – they must be destroyed before they can flower, they 
must be destroyed by love and forgiveness. 
I see now how, your wounds still unhealed, you extend your hand to Europe 
in trust, but without peace. Are our spirits still of different hues? I see you 
sizing each other up: the two of you are still not sure how much you can trust 
each other. However, it is time to stop healing those lies with lies. It is time 
for you to stand up straight, to show that you have learned something, to 
prevent the same mistakes from happening again. For you to grasp that 
change comes from within, and to nurture the true colours of your spirit, to 
understand, accept and show them as they are. For you to open again to 
Europe, which you have always been part of. It is time to become a home 
again for those you sent away, whose minds have glowed like fireflies in 
some foreign night.  
Show your youth, your enormous strength, which you concealed for years, 
and which seethed, desiring to be seen. Show Europe your goodness. Only 
then will you be able to offer your children a better future. Let it be founded 
on love, forgiveness and reconciliation. And this time let it be true.  
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